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Introduction 
 
As is true of many initial audits, whether of a for-profit company or public agency, this Audit 
Report relates both “good news” and “bad news.”  While some readers may emphasize the bad 
news, we believe the overarching message should be that the Cuyahoga Board of Election’s 
authorization for the November 2006 election audit is itself crucial good news about the agency’s 
prospects for moving forward decisively. 
 
We – the Collaborative Audit Committee and the coordinating Center for Election Integrity – 
strongly affirm that independent audits provide information to a public agency that will allow it 
to move forward with clear knowledge of its successes, and also of problems that need to be 
rectified.  In the election context, audits permit the identification of problems with election 
managerial systems or technology, such as with voting machines or tabulation equipment, and 
thus allow an agency such as a local election board to develop an effective action plan for 
improvement.  An election agency’s adoption of a practice of full disclosure about (1) its efforts 
to identify successes and problems fully and impartially, and also (2) its plan to correct the 
problems, is the path toward rebuilding the public’s respect and trust in reported election results.   
    
Proposals to audit elections may raise internal objections because problems may be discovered 
that otherwise might remain hidden.  But the absence of election audits works to both the 
agency’s and the public’s disadvantage:  problems may remain unknown and uncorrected, and 
questions or charges about election accuracy continue, reducing public confidence in the agency.  
Any staff efforts expended to conceal problems not only wastes energies and reduces public 
confidence, but also means that when the problems do surface eventually, sometimes in a 
particularly injurious manner, the agency may be shaken to its foundations.  Better, we believe, 
to discover the areas of success and those of needed improvement, and deploy resources to 
improve. 
 
With the support of major political party county organizations, the Cuyahoga Board of Elections 
authorized this audit, for which we believe it deserves public recognition.  While the Audit 
participants did encounter impediments and delays to the auditing process, we believe that even 
these provided opportunities for learning more about the administrative, technical, or legal 
changes that need to occur to smooth the process for auditing elections as a routine matter.    
 
Even though this election audit cannot provide conclusive results on e-voting device accuracy, 
and could not be completed in the expected time frame because of a wide range of local 
managerial issues, we believe it provides an important first step toward election auditing in 
Cuyahoga County and in Ohio.   We hope that this Audit Report will assist the Ohio Secretary of 
State, all Ohio local Boards of Election, election reform organizations, and other election 
officials nationwide in seeing how an independent audit process can be created and function at 
the local level.  Additionally, we hope the public will recognize that this Report contains the kind 
of information that all election administrative agencies need to better achieve the public charge 
for producing accurate election results and to facilitate sound improvements in election 
administrative practices. 
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Executive Summary 
 
An independent audit of the unofficial count of the November 2006 election in Cuyahoga County 
was undertaken collaboratively through representatives1 by both major political parties and a 
number of election reform organizations.   Cleveland State University’s Center for Election 
Integrity and the Northern Ohio Data Information Service coordinated the audit process and 
technical services, and also supplied methodological guidance and statistical analysis.    
 
The representatives of the organizations, and the volunteers assisting, conducted two 
collaborative audits.  They are described here along with some terminology that will be useful in 
understanding the audit results. 
 
♦   A random sample of election reports from DRE touch screen voting machines was compared 
for consistency with the report of precinct election results from the GEMS tabulation computer. 
 
• The DRE voting machine produces a “Long Report” after the election has closed with 
vote counts for each race/issue in each precinct. 
• The central ballot tabulation system software is named GEMS.  The GEMS tabulation 
reports provide election results. 
• The SOVC Report is the comprehensive Statement of Votes Cast report from the GEMS 
server.  It shows the total votes cast for each candidate and issue by precinct. 
 
♦  A hand count of a random sample of absentee or “early voting” ballots was compared for 
consistency against a GEMS report of electronically tabulated election results. 
 
• Early/absentee ballots are optical scan paper ballots with voter selections marked on the 
ballot by the voter. 
• These ballots are read by an optical scan reader and with the voting information 
transmitted into the GEMS system. 
 
This audit did not evaluate:  internal controls of the CCBOE; security procedures or chain of 
custody for the Long Reports; or the consistency of individually cast DRE ballots with the totals 
recorded on the DRE unit’s Long Report.  Additional audit procedures would be needed to 
evaluate these areas and were beyond the scope of this audit.2  For a complete explanation of all 
the findings, please read this entire report.  
 
Selected Findings  
 
A.  DRE Touchscreen Voting Machines: Audit of the “Long Reports”
 
Conclusion One There is a high probability that the DRE Long Report (precinct) results 
match the GEMS produced election results published on November 8, 2006.   
 
                                                 
1 For the list of individuals and their credentials who participated in the Audit Committee, see the cover page.  For 
further background on the authorization of the audit, see Appendix 1.   
2 The impediments posed by Ohio state law to more complete auditing are discussed at II. B and III. B. 
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Recommendation:  We recommend that a random, independent audit of the election 
results be performed before CCBOE certifies the election.  (See Top Tier 
Recommendation #1 below).   
 
Conclusion Two  Expecting a complete set of DRE Long Reports with all data clearly 
recorded for all precincts currently is not realistic.   
 
Recommendation: As part of the planned security review, the CCBOE should assess the 
viability of using Long Reports as part of their overall security plan, and should take into 
account in selecting voting systems the ability to achieve full verification of the accuracy 
of election results.  
 
Conclusion Three  A number of DREs had been vendor-marked with non-unique serial 
numbers; several pairs of DREs were identified within the sample as having serial numbers 
duplicated in other DREs owned by CCBOE.    
  
Recommendation: Resolve the non-unique DRE serial number problem by taking a 
number of actions with Diebold and internal tracking of serial numbers.   
 
 
B.   Optical Scanning: Audit of “Early Absentee Ballots”  
 
Conclusion One  Election result data in the GEMS report corresponded closely to the results 
obtained by the audit hand count of the optical scan ballots. 
 
Conclusion Two  The sorting process for early absentee optical scan ballots into precinct 
batches prior to scanning was neither complete nor accurate. 
 
Recommendation:  Hand sorting into precincts and batches should be replaced by a more 
automated system with appropriate quality control measures.   
 
Conclusion Three There was a very low frequency of discrepancies that appears to be caused 
by a scanner misreading of some of the optical scan ballots. 
 
Recommendation:  An audit similar to this, comparing electronically recorded optical 
scan results to those obtained by hand-counted examination of the optical scan ballots, 
should be performed after every election and before certification.     
 
Conclusion Four  Some ballots were apparently scanned for the tabulation at one point but 
were not included in the GEMS elections results or on the SOVC, probably because the 
ballot batch had been deleted (because of flawed data) and then was not rescanned. 
 
Recommendation:  Deletion of ballot batches must have greater quality control to ensure 
re-scanning of the deck.   
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Conclusion Five   Some ballot batches were scanned twice producing a double-count of 
those ballots and their votes. 
 
Recommendation:  The electronic identification of an optical scan ballot batch should be 
unique and constant; and greater quality control measures need to be introduced to ensure 
all ballot batches are counted only once.  
 
Conclusion Six   The electronic identification of a ballot batch may change within the 
scanning process and between scanning events, reducing the ability to accurately track that 
the ballot batch has been counted, and counted only once. 
 
Recommendation:   A mechanism should be developed to record and track batches of 
ballots with appropriate quality control measures. 
 
C.  Security, Accuracy, and Sufficiency of the Data Needed for Auditing  
 
Conclusion One  The CCBOE’s lack of compliance with its own electronic and physical 
security policy is unacceptable. 
 
 Recommendation.  An independent assessment of the security policy’s adequacy and its 
implementation within the CCBOE should occur. 
 
Conclusion Two  Some indicators of possible database corruption were identified in an 
initial database integrity evaluation.   
 
Recommendation:   The CCBOE should initiate an independent evaluation of the GEMS 
tabulation database by a qualified consultant to ascertain whether database corruption occurred in 
the November 2006 election. 
 
 
Top Tier Recommendations for Systemic Improvement 
 
1.  Independent audits should become a routine part of the election process.  
 
Independent auditing is standard business practice and should be applied to our election and 
voting systems because of their importance.  A reasonable approach might be to perform a 
professional or other independent audit after each major election and a collaborative internal 
audit after smaller local elections.  The time and cost involved do not need to be exorbitant and 
will decrease as problems are resolved and process controls put in place.  The audit should occur 
prior to certifying the election. 
 
Although this audit found a relatively small number of ballot batches that had been miscounted 
in the unofficial optical scan count, the audit identifies problems that indicate proper procedures 
for tabulation accuracy were not consistently followed.  Institution of routine independent audits 
will facilitate tabulation accuracy, and administrative and technical improvements, and thus 
demonstrate to the public that confidence in the election process is well founded.   
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2.  Reconsider the feasibility and wisdom of supporting two major voting systems: optical 
scan and DRE touch screens. 
 
The problems found in this audit, the Election Sciences Institute audit of the May Primary, and 
report from the Cuyahoga Election Review Panel (July 2006) call into question whether it is 
practical and cost effective for Cuyahoga County to support two voting machine systems (i.e., 
electronic and optical scan).  Some factors to be considered include:  
 
• Election costs for 2006 substantially exceeded the budget allocated;    
• It is unclear if DRE electronic voting can support the turnout in a Presidential election;  
• CCBOE staff must be hired and trained to support both systems, and have not reached 
high performance standards in managing either system; by focusing on one system higher 
performance standards can likely be met more quickly.  
• The DRE devices present considerably greater hurdles to cost-effective and complete 
auditing than do paper optical scan ballots. 
 
 
3.  A comprehensive evaluation of the election database should be undertaken by qualified 
technical professionals who are independent of voting system vendors.  
 
Some indicators of possible database corruption were identified in an initial database review but 
were not investigated despite the Monitor’s repeated urging.  In an independent evaluation of the 
GEMS official results database the task should be:    
 
• to ascertain whether database corruption occurred in the November 2006 election 
database,  
• and if so, to determine the scope and impact of any corruption for the tabulated and 
reported results;  and  
• in light of Microsoft warnings, to provide  recommendations on how to avoid tabulation 
database corruption to the maximum extent feasible, delineating the steps to be taken to 
protect election data as tabulations are occurring.  
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Glossary of Terms Used 
 
Absentee voter: Voters who cast their ballots before Election Day, by mail or in-person at the 
Board of Elections; they do not vote at a precinct polling place.   
 
Absentee audit: An audit of the optical scan ballots used by absentee voters. 
 
Batch: The digital representation of a scanned deck (or decks) of optical scan ballots as recorded 
by GEMS.  
 
CCBOE:  As commonly used, this term can confusingly designate either the agency that 
conducts elections in Cuyahoga County -- the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections—or its four-
member governing Board.  In this Audit Report we use CCBOE to refer to the agency as a 
whole, which includes its staff as well as its governing Board.  The Board is comprised of two 
Republican and two Democratic members who normally are nominated by the local major 
political parties and then formally appointed by the Ohio Secretary of State.    
 
CAC:  Collaborative Audit Committee—the representatives of the two major political parties 
and three election oversight and advocacy organizations (see cover page) who composed the 
policymaking arm of this Audit. 
 
CEI: Center for Election Integrity of Cleveland State University, which was appointed to serve 
as the Public Monitor of Cuyahoga County election reform by both the Cuyahoga Board of 
County Commissioners and the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.     
 
CERP:  Cuyahoga Election Review Panel.  The Panel was appointed by the Cuyahoga County 
Commissioners and the Board of Elections to review the 2006 Primary Election and make 
recommendations for improvement.  The Panel published a final report on their findings, known 
as the CERP Report (www.csuohio.edu/cei/).  
 
CSV file: Comma Separated Values file; a file format used for data files that permits them to be 
read on a variety of computers.   
 
Deck:  The electronic representation of a batch of optical scan ballots that will be scanned 
together and whose votes will be reported to the GEMS database as a unit.   
 
DESI: Diebold Election Systems, Inc. the subdivision of Diebold, Inc. that manufactures and 
markets election voting systems and technical consulting services.  Cuyahoga County uses 
Diebold’s    
 
DIMS: This is the software program Diebold Election Systems markets for recording voter 
registrations, processing absentee ballot applications, evaluating candidate or issue petitions, and 
managing poll worker information (It is the acronym of Data Information Management System).  
The Cuyahoga CCBOE uses DIMS in all of these ways.  DESI materials note it interfaces 
“seamlessly” with the GEMS election tabulation software but this interface has been highly 
problematic in our County.   
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DRE:  a type of electronic voting machine where the machine electronically records voters’ 
choices (Direct Recording Electronic).  In Cuyahoga County, the DRE model that is used is a 
Diebold AccuVote TSX with VVPAT printer.  This DRE is a “touchscreen” where the computer 
monitor shows the ballot, and the voter “touches” rectangular boxes shaped to look like buttons 
to simulate the pushing of a button under a ballot choice.  Most of Cuyahoga County voters 
currently vote on DREs at the precincts on Election Day.   
 
EAC:  U.S. Election Assistance Commission.  The EAC was established by the Help America 
Vote Act (HAVA).  It disbursed federal funds to States for replacing their voting systems.  
Currently, the EAC’s prime task is to facilitate election administration improvements.  It serves 
as a national clearinghouse and resource for information pertaining to the administration of 
federal elections, including for the technical aspects of voting systems.    
 
EDT: Election Day Technicians, a special poll worker position created by the Cuyahoga 
CCBOE to activate and manage the DRE touchscreen units at polling locations.   
 
Election certification:  Formal approval of the CCBOE is required to officially confirm the 
results of an election.  The date for certification is established by Ohio statutes. 
 
ESI:  The Election Science Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan election management-consulting 
firm located in San Francisco that was retained by the Cuyahoga County Commissioners in April 
2006 to evaluate the accuracy of the DRE touch-screen voting units.  ESI conducted an audit of 
the individual printed ballots cast on DRE units in the county’s May 2006 Primary election. 
 
E-voting:  refers to “electronic voting.”  While the term is somewhat contested as far as its 
scope, generally it refers to any device on which voters cast ballots, or any election system where 
the reading, recording or tabulation of votes cast involves computers.  
 
Flash memory: Internal computer memory within each DRE touch-screen unit, which stores 
election, results until erased.  Votes cast on the electronic voting machines are recorded in two 
places: 1) the memory cards that are inserted before the election and removed after the election 
for counting, and 2) in flash memory located on a computer chip which remains inside the voting 
machine.   
 
Firmware:  Vendor-installed operating software. 
 
GEMS: this is an abbreviation for a computer software program (Global Election Management 
System) that Diebold Election Systems sells for the creation of electronic and paper ballots, and to 
serve as the central tabulation program for recording and counting votes.  The Cuyahoga CCBOE 
uses GEMS in all these ways.   
 
Long Report: From the DRE units, a paper printout of the summary election results (votes 
sorted into candidate and issue, presented by precinct) for all the ballots that were cast on the one 
DRE voting machine from which the printout was generated (from an integrated printer). 
 
Memory card:  A removable electronic disk similar to a “floppy” that records the votes cast on 
a DRE voting machine.  In Cuyahoga County, the memory cards are inserted into the electronic 
voting machine before the election, removed at the end of the election, and delivered to the 
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CCBOE where the voting data are uploaded to GEMS to count the votes cast on the DRE 
machine and recorded on the memory card.  
 
NODIS: Northern Ohio Data Information Service, the regional data center located at Cleveland 
State University.  NODIS provided statistical and other professional support for the 
Collaborative Audit. 
 
Optical scan ballot: A paper ballot, which in November 1006, was divided into three columns.   
The ballot lists each race or issue with ovals beside each voting choice.  To cast a vote that can 
be accurately read by the counting machine (“scanner”), the voter colors in the oval that reflects 
the voter’s choice. 
 
Optical scanner:  The computerized device used to read and record the votes marked on paper 
ballots (“optical scan ballots”).  Each scanner is connected to the GEMS computer by a wired 
network, where the GEMS program tabulates and reports election results.   
 
PDF file:  Portable Document Format, a type of file format.   
 
Precinct: A geographic subdivision of a county, town, city, or ward for election purposes. 
 
SOVC Report: The comprehensive Statement of Votes Cast report from the GEMS server.  It 
can show the total votes cast for each candidate and issue by precinct. 
 
VVPAT: By Ohio statute, every DRE unit must be equipped with a printer that will produce for 
the voter’s review a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail.  The VVPAT is the printout of each 
voter’s selections.  After it prints, the voter must push a button affirming that this is the VVPAT 
correctly presented the voter’s choices in order for the ballot to be officially cast and counted.  
The VVPAT is the official legal ballot of voters who vote on DRE units in Ohio. 
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FULL REPORT 
 
Collaborative Public Audit for Cuyahoga County 
 
I.  Background:   Achieving Independent Verification of Election Results 
 
Achieving accuracy in reported election results is a primary objective for any quality election 
administration.  Given the range of recent information reported nationally about possible 
problems with e-voting technologies, and also some of the problems the Cuyahoga County Board 
of Election (CCBOE) experienced in prior elections, local election reform organizations and the 
major political parties sought to have the county’s election results independently verified as 
accurate reflections of the ballots cast in the November 2006 election.  In early fall, the chief 
initial public concerns focused on the DRE touchscreen voting devices which were to be used at 
polling places on election day.     
 
After discussions with election reform organizations about their concerns, the Public Monitor of 
Cuyahoga Election Reform3 introduced at a Board of Elections public meeting a proposal for a 
Collaborative Public Audit. The proposal pledged that the Monitor would seek the cooperative 
involvement of the local Democratic and Republican Parties, plus several election reform 
organizations to conduct the independent audit.  The proposal also requested the CCBOE to send 
a representative to the audit-planning group.4  Per the reform organizations’ requests, the audit 
was to focus on the Diebold DRE touchscreen voting machines that are primarily used in 
Cuyahoga County for Election Day voting at the polling locations.  Later, by political party 
request, the audit was expanded to encompass the optical scanning operations.   
 
? Further background information on the process for obtaining authority to conduct the 
audits, and the participants and governing structure, can be found in Appendix 1.   
The Collaborative Audit participants believe the public deeply desires independent verification 
that the election results that the e-voting technology has generated are accurate.  We additionally 
suggest that both the election administrative staff and the public at large need to know whether 
the voting machines’ programming maintained its integrity after the machines passed the pre-
election testing and were deployed to the polling locations for Election Day.  Reliable 
information on these and other questions are crucial so that sound decisions can be made as to 
the voting and database technologies we used and so that any corrections in administrative or 
other systems that are needed can be identified.   
We believe that yet another reason led to broad support for election auditing in our county.  Our 
local and statewide election reform organizations (and perhaps also the county political parties) 
supported the initiation of election auditing to increase incentives for the administrative staff 
effort to reach higher standards of tabulation and reporting accuracy, and to deter the prospect of 
                                                 
3 The Center for Election Integrity of Cleveland State University per a proposal and testimony prepared by its 
Director, Candice Hoke. 
4 After numerous requests for a representative or liaison who would serve as a non-voting member of the Audit 
committee, the CCBOE Director declined to authorize a representative. 
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tampering.   The thought was that CCBOE managers would desire the independent audit “report 
card” to be a positive report regarding the accuracy and management of the election. 
A national Election Audit Workgroup teaming the Brennan Center with the Samuelson Law, 
Technology & Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall School of Law (UC Berkeley), as well as 
several election officials and leading academics has been working to evaluate current audit laws 
and procedures, and to provide critical analysis to public officials as they begin to adopt audit 
schemes and procedures. The Workgroup has thus far identified five core goals that should 
motivate the design of election auditing:  increasing public confidence in the results of an 
election; deterring fraud against the voting system; detecting large-scale systemic errors; 
providing feedback that will allow jurisdictions to improve elections and machinery in future 
years, and confirming to a high level of confidence that a 100% manual recount would not 
change the outcome of the race. 
 
We agree strongly with this statement of election auditing design goals but would add a sixth: 
providing additional incentives for the staff to reach higher standards of accuracy.    In order to 
achieve these six and other auditing goals, we have concluded, as has the Election Audit 
Workgroup, that the independence of the auditing entity is essential.5
 
Largely because of the unexpected impediments to election auditing that the Cuyahoga effort 
encountered, this audit might best be considered a pilot program for identifying the necessary 
procedural or informational components that must be in place in order to conduct an effective 
audit of two different types of voting systems.  Some of these components can be achieved by 
local Board of Election policy and procedural changes but others will likely require the Secretary 
of State’s action.  Still other impediments exist because of State statutory law but this audit may 
assist in identifying the legislative action that would be warranted.     
 
While the audits that were conducted are limited rather than comprehensive and conclusive on 
the questions of accurate tabulation of election results in November’s election, the information 
acquired should be useful for achieving the other election performance and auditing goals 
identified above.    
 
The Collaborative Audit Committee would like to thank the over forty volunteers that gave their 
time over numerous days to help conduct this audit.  Without this huge volunteer effort, this 
audit would not have been possible.  We also commend the Cuyahoga Board of Election for 
taking an Ohio leadership role in initiating election auditing and thus creating an independent 
mechanism for verifying the announced election results.   
 
 
                                                 
5 Lawrence D. Norden, Statement to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration, 
Subcommittee on Elections, March 20, 2007 at 2; Candice Hoke, Statement to the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, March 20, 2007 at 2 (this testimony to the 
Subcommittee on Elections that held hearings on Federal Election Auditing can be found at 
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6445).   
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II. DRE Touchscreen Voting Machines:  Audit of the “Long Reports” as   
Compared to the GEMS Tabulation Computer    
 
A.  Background 
 
On Election Days, most Cuyahoga County voters now cast their ballots on an electronic 
voting device called a “DRE touchscreen.”  This device allows voters to read their ballot on 
the computer screen and push buttons on the screen to register their voting choices.  At the 
end of choosing their voting choices, the DRE produces a summary page on screen to allow 
the voter to check to see whether the machine has recorded the individual’s votes correctly.  
The voter can choose to return to earlier pages and change a vote.  (Technically, a DRE 
voting device is a “direct recording electronic” voting machine that maintains an internal 
computer chip memory of ballots cast as well as records the same data on a removable 
memory card.)  Cuyahoga County owns approximately 6,000 Diebold DRE voting devices.6
 
How and why “Long Reports” are produced.  Ohio statutory law requires that all DRE units 
produce a “voter verified paper audit trail” or VVPAT.  When a citizen uses a DRE 
touchscreen to vote, the unit prints for the voter’s review a list of the ballot choices the voter 
made so that the voter can verify his or her vote before pressing a button that essentially 
means “yes, the printout of my voting choices is correct; count this ballot as is.”  The paper 
on which this statement of voting choices is printed is called the VVPAT.   
 
Cuyahoga County has administratively organized its elections so that all the DRE units in a 
voting location (for instance, a school gym) can be used by voters from any precincts 
assigned to that location.  The poll workers are trained to encode the “voter access card” so 
that the machine will bring up on screen the correct ballot for the precinct in which the voter 
is registered.   
 
At the end of the night after the polls have closed and the DRE touch screens are being 
closed out, the poll workers command each DRE machine to print its “Long Report.”  The 
Long Report is of varying length but a constant three inches wide (in rough dimensions).  
The quality of the paper is similar to a cash register receipt.  The print font is smaller than 
many register receipts.   (See Appendix 5 for a Long Report example). 
 
The DRE “Long Report” summarizes in print (on the register-receipt paper) the election 
results for the ballots that were cast on that particular DRE unit.  Each unit’s Long Report 
reflects the internal DRE unit’s computer sorting of all ballots and results voted on that DRE 
unit, providing results by precinct for every race and issue that is present on the ballots that 
were voted in that location.  The Long Report does not reproduce the individual voter’s ballot 
choices; these records are sealed on election night and not opened unless needed for a 
recount.    
 
In voting locations that are assigned many precincts, the Long Reports can extend well over 
20 feet since the results of each precinct must be separately stated on the Long Report.  For 
instance, a voting location with eight precincts but with virtually identical ballots for each 
                                                 
6 Cuyahoga County uses the Diebold AccuVote TSX with VVPAT printer. 
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precinct will produce Long Reports that will state the results for U.S. Senate, for Governor, 
for Attorney General, etc., eight separate times to reflect each precinct’s election results.  The 
audit volunteers had to examine closely the Long Report for every DRE unit in a location 
(which could number as many as 40 units) to locate and record the results for the particular 
precinct that was randomly selected for the audit. 
 
 
B.  Objectives and Limitations of the Audit 
 
Objectives.    The objective of the DRE-GEMS portion of the audit was to determine whether 
the votes cast in the precincts as represented in the Long Reports are accurately recorded in 
the CCBOE’s GEMS (central computer election tabulation) results report for the unofficial 
count7 of the election (meaning the election results that were generated on November 8, 2007 
not including provisional votes or absentee votes).   This audit would thus check to see 
whether the DRE memory cards’ recording of votes that were transferred (“uploaded”) into 
the GEMS computer matched the Long Report results that were printed at the precinct on 
election night before the memory cards were pulled out and sent to the CCBOE offices8.    
 
Unexplained discrepancies could mean: 
 
• The voting data on the DRE memory cards became corrupted, lost or altered at some 
point after the Long Reports were printed from the memory cards at the polls to the 
point at which the GEMS unofficial report was printed, or 
 
• The GEMS database lost/failed to receive data from the DRE memory cards. 
 
The audit analysis consists of two parts: 
  
(1) A comparison of precinct-level counts between GEMS-produced data provided by the 
CCBOE (in “csv format”) with Long Report data collected by volunteers from a sample 
of precincts; and, 
 
                                                 
7 Unofficial results count most but not all ballots.  The unofficial results are typically announced late Tuesday night 
or early Wednesday.  In Cuyahoga County, the unofficial count excludes, for instance, provisional ballots, some late 
arriving absentee ballots, and optical scan ballots cast at the polling places by curbside voters. 
8  It may appear at first blush that the DRE memory cards’ arrival in the CCBOE offices for “uploading” is an easy 
task to achieve.  Actually, the process has numerous junctures where an error can lead to an inability to produce 
complete and prompt election results.  A few of the steps are: 
• Poll workers must understand the sequencing of closing steps so that they eject the memory cards 
at the correct time 
• All DRE units must be checked to ensure that all memory cards have been collected 
• All memory cards in a polling location (which in our county can number high as 40) must be 
counted and packed into the appropriate bag and sealed. 
• The driver/transportation for memory cards must arrive on time and transport the cards quickly to 
the CCBOE offices 
As we have observed locally, the opportunity for mistakes and potential threats to the integrity of the memory cards 
inhere in the DRE voting system. 
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(2) An analysis of the “auditability” (ability to be used for an effective audit) of the Long 
Reports, which concerns their illegibility or unavailability (e.g., due to paper tears, 
printing jams, or absence from the appropriate envelopes).   
 
Limitations.  This DRE-GEMS audit was limited because of (1) Ohio election law and (2) 
resources.  When we obtained authorization for the DRE audit, we presented an ambitious 
plan for conducting it right after Election Day but before the certified count occurred.  This 
timing was designed so that if any discrepancies were found, they could be investigated and 
corrected before the legal certified count occurred.9  
 
Conducting this audit before the certification meant that the VVPATs of individual voters’ 
ballot choices were off-limits to witnesses and CCBOE staff.  State law compelled the 
VVPATs to remain under seal until the recounts occurred, to protect the integrity of the 
ballots.  (Ohio law explicitly makes the VVPAT record the official ballot and not the 
electronic ballot when a recount occurs.) Recounts are permitted only after certification.  
Hence, we could not obtain access to the individual ballots to check whether the Long 
Reports added the votes correctly.   
 
Even after the optical scanning audit was added to the audit and we knew that we had to wait 
until after the recounts to conduct that portion of the audit, we did not request to conduct a 
more exact audit of the DREs’ individual ballots to determine whether the Long Reports 
accurately reported these votes.  Our reasons included:  
 
• We knew that we could not produce the number of volunteers necessary for such an 
audit in mid-late December;  
• We believed that we had a significant auditing project already and this was sufficient 
as a first step in local election auditing;   
• We explicitly stated at the time the audit was proposed that it was not the broadest, 
most optimal election audit that could be run, but we believed it to be a strong initial 
step toward independent verification of election results;   
• Finally, given that the CCBOE Board had planned to initiate a professional audit, any 
auditing beyond our Collaborative Public Audit effort could be left to the professional 
auditors.   
  
Our DRE audit also cannot check the accuracy of the GEMS results as compared with 
individual DRE unit Long Reports.  The lowest level of GEMS tabulation results available to 
us was the results for the precincts – not for individual DRE units.  Thus we could not audit a 
selection of DRE units’ reports against the GEMS reported results but could only audit down 
to the precinct level.  This limitation was thus a function of the software design (as 
represented to us by CCBOE Ballot managers) rather than our auditing policy choice.10
                                                 
9  Many unanticipated impediments and delays occurred which, with new management and logistical planning at the 
CCBOE, should not occur in future audits.  
 
10 Further investigation of whether the GEMS software product has the ability to produce election data by DRE unit 
should occur; this question was beyond the scope of this audit.    
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C.  Methodology 
 
Overview.   Rather than audit 100% of the precincts, audit methodology and statistical 
science have shown that auditing a random selection of precincts can predict what the error 
rates would be if all the precincts were audited.  The number of precincts to be audited to 
achieve a 99% confidence level in the predictive capacity of the sample will differ according 
to the closeness of the results.  Closer elections require auditing a higher percentage of 
precincts.11   
 
The Collaborative Audit participants met prior to the election to plan the audit tasks and 
procedures.  Within 48 hours after the unofficial election results reporting, the Audit 
Committee met to select the races to be auditing.  The Committee’s selection process resulted 
in the choice to audit the following three races in the DRE-GEMS audit:12
 
• Ohio Auditor General race between Barbara Sykes and Mary Taylor 
• Cuyahoga County judicial race between Hollie Gallagher and Jeff Hastings  
• Ohio Supreme Court contest between Terrence O’Donnell and William O’Neill  
 
To ensure that all three races audited in the DRE-GEMS analysis would have a very high 
level of predictive reliability, the Collaborative Audit Committee (CAC) chose to use the 
closest race (among those selected for auditing) as the determinant of how many precincts 
would be audited.    
 
To determine which of these races had been the closest electoral contest, the CAC relied on 
the unofficial election results reports.  These reports included the votes recorded at the 
polling places on DRE units and also the early absentee optically scanned ballots.  If the race 
was a statewide race, then two results reports were used to determine the electoral margin 
between the candidates: (a) the state unofficial results and (b) our county’s unofficial results.  
This statistical analysis determined the need for a random sample of 132 precincts to produce 
a 99 percent confidence level. (See Appendix 1 for complete description of the sampling 
methodology.) 
 
Dr. Mark Salling and his NODIS team generated a random selection of 132 precincts.   The 
selected precincts were not known to anyone in the CCBOE or in the CAC prior to the audit 
team’s arrival in the CCBOE offices for the audit when Dr. Salling provided the list so that 
the selected precinct envelopes could be pulled from the sealed bins.13  
 
Volunteers and professional staff conducted the DRE-GEMS audit of the Long Reports on 
November 9 and 14, and December 1, 2006.  NODIS professionals created a paper form for 
audit data to be recorded from the Long Reports.   (See Appendix 2 for a sample form).   
Volunteers were trained on site on where to find the correct data and how to record it on the 
form.   The requested data included:   
                                                 
11 Norden testimony to Elections Subcommittee, see note 3 above,  
12 The CAC selected county or statewide races, with each political party selecting a race and the civic groups 
selecting the third race.   
13 We recommend that public viewing of the random selection of precincts occur, or that the process be videotaped 
with the original tape provided as a public record per the Brennan Center report. 
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• total votes recorded for each candidate in the selected precinct in each of the three 
electoral contests;   
• total ballots cast for the selected precinct; 
• DRE serial number; 
• audit materials integrity information concerning whether the Long Report was torn, 
incomplete, or reflected printing problems; 
• whether the report was signed at the bottom, as required by Ohio law, by at least four 
persons (pollworkers); and 
• identification of the audit team recording the data.  
 
After the volunteers recorded the Long Report data on the paper forms at the CCBOE offices, 
copies of these raw data forms were made and held for distribution to each participating 
organization if requested. The raw data was subsequently entered into a computer at 
Cleveland State University for further processing and reporting.  Center staff then provided 
copies of the electronic data spreadsheet recording the raw data and copies of the paper raw 
data forms that were filled out by the volunteers to each participating organization so that 
they could check the data entry themselves.   Special procedures were designed to prevent 
errors in volunteers’ data collection, to verify the data in an ongoing manner, and to provide a 
traceable path that could be checked and permit correction of errors in case any were 
discovered.   
 
Detail of Chain of Custody and On-site Audit Activities.  The first on-site step in the audit 
process was locating the envelopes for the selected precincts.  The Long Reports, as 
mentioned above, are long cashier tape paper rolls printed from each DRE within a given 
voting location.  On Election Day evening, as the polling place materials arrived in the 
administrative offices for tabulating the vote, CCBOE staff removed (in front of trained 
witnesses) the extraneous materials from Long Envelopes (that had been sealed at the polling 
places) and then replaced the Long Reports in the correct precinct envelope with a new 
seal.14  The staff then placed all the Long Envelopes (that were labeled with a polling 
location name and that had been stuffed with the Long Reports) into bins that were sealed 
with recorded seal numbers.  The staff did not file the Long Envelopes in any particular 
order, thus the volunteer auditors had to check each bin seal to ensure the unbroken chain of 
custody.  They then searched through approximately 40 large bins to find the polling place 
Long Envelopes that would contain the randomly selected precincts’ Long Reports.  
 
Working in teams of two and seated at tables in the same room where the polling place 
materials had been processed on Election Day, the volunteers examined each Long Report 
from a given polling place to locate the precinct results for the three races to be audited.  
Because voters from all precincts assigned to the location could use any DRE within their 
polling place, every DRE Long Report used in a particular polling place had to be examined 
for whether any of the chosen precinct’s voters had cast ballots on that machine.   Unrolling 
and re-rolling the narrow and relatively fragile Long Reports (which could easily stretch over 
                                                 
14 Midway through the night, the CCBOE staff ceased resealing the envelopes because of time pressures and chose 
to rely on the storage bins being sealed.   
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20 feet long) was a very time-consuming and tedious process.15  Selected precincts that were 
located in a polling place having few DRE units were much quicker to audit since fewer 
Long Reports had to be analyzed.    
 
For each precinct analyzed, the volunteers took an audit data form and recorded at the top 
their names, the time they started, and the time they finished.  For each Long Report, they 
recorded the DRE serial number printed at the top of the Long Report, the total number of 
ballots cast from that precinct, and the number of votes recorded for each candidate in the 
three audited races.  They also noted and recorded information and characteristics about the 
report (e.g. if it was torn and how many poll workers signed at the bottom). The name of the 
polling place stated on the Long Report was always verified. 
 
By working in pairs, each data step was double-checked by at least one person.  One person 
read the results off the Long Reports while the other recorded the data.  Periodically, they 
were then required to confirm each other’s work.   
 
Evaluating the Audit Data   The data that volunteers recorded at the CCBOE was entered 
into a computer.  Then this Long Report data was compared by precinct to GEMS-produced 
data (on electronic files), with careful notes as to which results did not match in all races and 
total votes cast.  Professional staff looked for and corrected any computer data entry errors 
that resulted in any of the unmatched results and then examined the data recording sheets for 
factors that would account for unmatched counts.  When there were discrepancies that could 
not be explained, volunteers returned to the CCBOE to pull the appropriate Long Reports and 
double check their auditing work.  By following this approach, we were able to ensure that 
no discrepancies occurred because of auditor data-recording errors.  
 
The Center’s professional staff also calculated the frequency of discrepancies that occurred 
as well as all Long Report materials problems (e.g., torn, incomplete, or unsigned). 
 
 
D.  Findings 
 
Comparison of Counts and Accuracy of the Tabulation.   Among the 132 precincts for 
which we recorded Long Reports data, 95 precincts’ election results data for the three races 
and total ballots cast perfectly matched the GEMS computer data for all three races and total 
ballots cast.  While it is possible that the Long Reports data match the GEMS data only 
because of balancing errors in both, the probability of that occurring is extremely small. Thus 
we conclude that since the data in the DRE Long Reports correctly matched the GEMS 
counts for those precincts and within the limitations discussed above, both sources of data 
correctly presented the votes for those precincts and election races. 
 
Among the remaining 37 precincts (see Appendix 6 “All Unmatched Precincts”), for some 
precincts the data collection was harmed owing to torn or illegible Long Reports that affected 
only a portion of the three races to be audited.  Wherever we had a complete set of results for 
a chosen race, we compared those races even if one or both of the other races’ data could not 
                                                 
15 By chance, the largest polling location in Cuyahoga County, Brook Park -- having 40 DRE units – was in our 
random sample.  So we had to analyze all 40 Long Reports in order to record the one selected precinct’s data.    
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be analyzed because the Long Report was torn or quit printing in precisely the location where 
that needed data was located.    We found that Long Reports from six more precincts had 
sufficient data that at least some of the three races were auditable.  For each race that could 
be audited, the Long Report data matched the GEMS computer data exactly.   
  
The other 31 precincts, however, were not auditable because, owing to one or more materials 
problems with the Long Reports (including missing reports, reports that were torn, reports 
reflecting printing problems due to printer jams), some essential data was not available for 
each of the three races we were auditing.  The Long Reports deficiencies for these 31 
precincts were noted by volunteers when they were attempting to record all the requisite 
election data needed.    
 
Missing or defective Long Reports led to an inability to audit a sample size as large as 
originally planned. The sample design attempted to take into account a limited number of 
such problems by adding another 20 percent to the sample size.  Clearly the problems of 
missing or damaged reports exceeded reasonable expectations.   
 
 
Points Raising Concerns 
 
Duplicate DRE Serial Numbers.  We found several Long Reports with the same DRE serial 
number but that recorded different election results (see Appendices 4 and 5). 
 
In one case, two sets of two DRE Long Reports (each pair having the same DRE serial 
number) presented different vote counts.  Rather surprisingly, each of these two pairs of DRE 
machines was assigned to a common polling location.  In each of these cases, the votes 
reflected in each of the four Long Reports appear to have been included within the GEMS 
totals; when we included all four DREs’ votes for comparison with GEMS, the GEMS totals 
matched the Long Reports perfectly.    
 
In another case of duplicate Long Reports, we found a pair of reports from DRE units having 
the same DRE serial number, but these DREs were assigned to different polling locations.   
 
When asked about these duplicate serial numbers, a representative of the CCBOE stated the 
following in an email: 
 
It appears as though Diebold transposed serial numbers when it loaded firmware [vendor-
installed operating software] into these machines.  The serial numbers on the machines 
themselves are sequential (hardware).  This is problematic because the linkage to the 
memory card is off the serial number presented by the screen….    
   
If indeed the serial numbers were entered by Diebold, including some mistaken duplicate 
numbers, and then shipped to the CCBOE, the chances of two machines with duplicate serial 
numbers ending up at the same polling location within our sample is extremely unlikely.  
Given that we found this situation twice in our sample, this explanation merits further 
exploration.  We have not been provided any further explanation from Diebold or from the 
CCBOE. 
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No DRE Serial Number.  The audit found 19 instances where the DRE serial number was 
missing from the Long Report or otherwise unavailable. This problem relates to the issue of 
torn and printing problems noted above. 
 
Five-digit DRE Serial Numbers.    Of unknown implication and importance we note here that 
we found two instances where the recorded DRE serial numbers were five digits in length. 
This is at variance from the six-digit length that we found for all the other serial numbers that 
were recorded.  While this might be a data entry error in the audit process, it also may reflect 
an error in the manufacturer’s creation of the serial numbers.  We did not make an extra 
check to ascertain whether it arose from a data entry error.  
 
Other Problems with the Long Reports 
 
Legally Required Poll Worker Signatures:  Among the 1,168 DRE Long Reports that 
the auditing teams examined, 354 or 30 percent lacked the legally specified four signatures.  
Among these 181 (16 percent of the total) had three signatures, 63 had only two signatures 
and two Long Reports had only one.  108 Long Reports weren’t signed at all (9%).   
 
Defective Long Reports:  Volunteers recorded information showing that 95 reports 
(8%) were torn, incomplete, or had apparently jammed in printing and that they either lost or 
may have lost Long Report data that was to be printed.  These figures exclude instances 
where we found a second Long Report from the same DRE unit, evidently printed to replace 
a report with such problems.  Given that we found and used for the audit a number of what 
appear to be replacement Long Reports, the 8% figure for the rate of defective Long Reports 
is a lower rate than actually occurred.   
 
Lack of Agreement between Unofficial PDF Versus Sum of Three CSV Files.  The PDF file 
of unofficial results that the CCBOE posted on its website presents totals that differ by very 
small amounts from the sum of the three unofficial CSV files (DRE polling place, early 
absentee on optical scan ballots, and “walk-in” absentee ballots on DREs at the CCBOE) we 
obtained from the Ballot Department to use in our audit.   
 
The accumulation of vote totals in the CSV files and the election results as presented in the 
published PDF file should reflect the exact same totals for the unofficial results, but 128 
precincts out of the 1,434 in the county do not match. They generally only differ by one or 
two votes. We do not have an explanation for this discrepancy (see Appendix 7 for complete 
list of precinct discrepancies).  For fuller exploration of data reliability issues, see Section IV. 
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E.  Conclusions 
 
Conclusion 1 
There is a high probability that the DRE Long Report results match the GEMS 
produced data for the election on November 7, 2006.   
 
This conclusion is important and reassuring.  For all of the randomly selected precincts for 
which the Long Reports were legible and available, the Long Reports vote totals for 
candidates matched the GEMS election results exactly.   More precisely, of the 132 precincts 
randomly selected for the audit, 95 matched the GEMS totals exactly. The balance of the 
precincts could not be evaluated because of missing or incomplete Long Reports.16
 
Conclusion 1, however, assumes that the Long Reports accurately reflect the ballots cast.  As 
explained above in the report, the accuracy of the Long Reports was not evaluated by this 
audit.   To be clear, for an election audit to be able to assess the likelihood that voters’ ballots 
cast on DRE units are accurately reflected in the reported election results, we would need 
audits (using scientific sampling) of at least three separate phases of the election vote-
recording and tabulation process:   
 
a. an audit of the individual voters’ ballots cast on DRE units to determine if the 
Long Report (a summary of all ballots and votes cast on that unit) accurately 
reflected the votes; plus 
 
b. an audit checking the correspondence of the DRE Long Reports to the GEMS 
tabulation data;  plus,  
 
c. an audit of the GEMS tabulation data to determine whether the results reported in 
the Totals lines accurately reflect the votes in the selected columns.   
 
Additionally, for utmost confidence in reported election results, an audit covering all three 
phases is needed at both the pre-certification and after the official canvass or certified count 
stages of election reporting.   
  
Conclusion 2 
Expecting a complete set of DRE Long Reports with all data clearly recorded for all 
precincts currently is not realistic.   
 
This conclusion is based on the problems we encountered with Long Reports (e.g., torn, 
missing, printing problems) in 37 of the 132 precincts in our sample.  The 132 precincts 
within the sample included 1,414 DRE machines so that would mean that 1,414 Long 
Reports were analyzed.    Of this number, 181 (13%) were not auditable.   Since, as noted 
above, voters could lawfully vote on any DRE in the polling place, some of these Long 
                                                 
16 We determined whether there were “missing” Long Reports based upon an electronic file we received from the 
CCBOE listing the number of DREs at each polling place.  We expected to find a Long Report for each DRE. It 
should be noted, however, that the CCBOE apparently had another list with a slightly different DRE count per 
polling place.  As we had no way of knowing which was more accurate, we used the file sent to us via official 
CCBOE channels. 
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Reports recorded results for more than one precinct in our sample.  In those cases, the 
damaged Long Report could cause the exclusion of two randomly selected precincts from the 
audit.   
 
These results are consistent with the ESI report’s finding that 9.66 percent of the VVPAT 
ballots were defective or compromised in some fashion in the May 2006 primary.17
 
Some of the Long Reports that CCBOE workers could not find for us may exist but could 
have been misfiled within the CCBOE on Election Night because precinct materials were 
flooding into the building and the staff was focused on retaining and uploading memory 
cards.   
 
Producing legible and complete Long Reports is difficult for a number of reasons: 
 
• Printer jams are common; 
• With the addition of electronic voting and voter ID requirements, poll worker duties 
have become more complicated;   
• Changing and reloading TSx printer paper is a complicated process, with a number of 
possible errors that can cause printer failure or marred Long Reports  
• In this county, nearly 6,000 Long Reports will need to be produced by poll workers 
who have had four to eight hours of training (often occurring weeks before the 
election); and 
• At the closing of the polls when the Long Reports need to be printed, poll workers are 
tired and the focus is on hurrying to obtain the memory cards so they can be sent for 
tabulation.  
 
Neither this recommendation nor its attempt to outline the causes of defective Long Reports 
should be taken to suggest that the CCBOE should relax or eliminate the effort to achieve 
proper printing of the Long Reports at the polling places.  Improvements in poll worker 
training should help to reduce the number of problematic Long Reports, and this should be an 
objective when planning improvements for poll worker training. 
 
Yet we must also point out that a voting system that leaves 8-13% of the precincts 
unauditable is highly problematic and will likely have serious consequences for voter 
confidence. 
 
Conclusion 3 
Some DREs have serial numbers that are non-unique and duplicate those found on 
other DRE units owned by the CCBOE.    
 
Our audit discovered some Long Reports having duplicate serial numbers, apparently printed 
by separate DREs that have been manufacturer-marked with the same serial number. Given 
that we found this problem in a random sample of Long Reports having predictive capacity, 
it is likely that other Cuyahoga County DREs have duplicate serial numbers.  The Board of 
Elections believes that this duplication occurred due to Diebold transposing serial numbers 
                                                 
17 “DRE Analysis for May 2006 Primary Cuyahoga County, Ohio,” Election Science Institute (August 2006), 102-
124. 
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when it loaded firmware into the DREs, thus resulting in two machines having the same 
serial number.  
 
Duplicate serial numbers raise at least three potentially harmful outcomes for the accuracy of 
vote counts, dependent upon whether certain safeguards are embedded in the GEMS 
software;  this professional assessment of GEMS protections is beyond the scope of the audit.  
First, if GEMS is allowing data associated with the same serial number to be uploaded twice, 
votes from the same DRE could potentially be counted twice.  Conversely, if two DREs have 
the same serial numbers, there is a risk of GEMS not allowing the votes from both voting 
units to be uploaded and overwriting the votes of one machine, thus losing votes.  Third, 
correct and unique serial numbers are also essential for being able to pull the correct vote 
records from DRE flash memory when a memory card is missing or unusable.   
 
Additionally, at least three possible logistical and administrative problems are raised by the 
duplicate serial number problem.  First, duplicate serial numbers make it impossible to audit 
machine performance across multiple elections.  Second, the serial numbers may also need to 
be unique for warranty purposes.  Third and last, the duplicate numbers may impede correct 
internal tracking of the machine’s physical location in CCBOE records.    
 
 
F.   Recommendations for CCBOE Action 
 
Recommendation 1   
 
Develop an Independent Random Audit Policy and Practice for Validating E-Voting 
Election Results.  
 
We recommend that an independent random audit of the election results be performed before 
CCBOE certification of the election.  Ideally, however, to verify the official count and its 
reported results, an audit would be performed after the official count but before those results 
were presented to the CCBOE Board for a certification vote.  This timing would be optimal, 
because it is the point at which all ballots have been counted and the CCBOE believes it is 
ready to certify the results.   Thus, any discrepancies can be corrected before certification.  
Given, however, that the Ohio General Assembly recently shortened the time frame for 
certification by almost a week, this optimal timing of the audit may not be feasible.  But with 
advance logistical planning and better procedures and staffing within the CCBOE, it might 
still be possible to achieve this objective.   
 
The largest problem currently, however, is the lack of any CCBOE procedures to undertake 
an independent verification of the election results generated by the GEMS software results 
before certification.  Quoting the Brennan Center landmark report “The Machinery of 
Democracy: Voting System Security, Accessibility, Usability, and Cost:”   
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Systems with voter-verified paper records provide little, if any, security benefit over 
systems without such records, unless there are regular audits and/or recounts of the 
paper records.18
 
The Collaborative Audit Committee is willing to work with the CCBOE to develop a plan 
and procedures under which expedited random auditing of every election and to help identify 
the time frame within which the auditing can occur.   This Audit Report can provide a 
template of the explanatory information the public needs to understand the process.  
Overview material about the voting systems can be simply restated with each election audit 
so that the audit report could be issued very quickly.  
 
While undoubtedly the best source for verification of the results is to use the voter-verified 
paper audit trail (VVPAT), by State law the VVPAT cannot be unsealed until the recounts 
occur (after certification).  Statutory law further bars auditing activities that might piggyback 
on the recount process.  Given these state law impediments to random auditing of the 
VVPAT before certification and also during the recounts, it may be that auditing the Long 
Reports as against the GEMS results is acceptable until state law changes can be achieved.   
 
Because eight to ten percent of the Long Reports are likely to be damaged and unusable in 
verification procedures, their value for verification audits is compromised.   But it appears 
that use of the Long Reports is the only mechanism for auditing DRE units at present.  Thus, 
neither this recommendation nor its attempt to outline the causes of defective Long Reports 
should be taken to suggest that the CCBOE should relax or eliminate the effort to achieve 
proper printing of the Long Reports at the polling places so long as the DREs are being used.  
Improvements in poll worker training should help to reduce the number of problematic Long 
Reports, and this should be an objective when planning improvements for poll worker 
training. 
 
Yet we must also point out that a voting system that leaves 8-13% of the precincts 
unauditable cannot command the voters’ trust.   This high proportion of unauditable precincts 
means that in many races, the margin of victory is substantially closer.   We understand that 
the vendor is planning to introduce a new printer model that may have fewer problems.  But 
we believe (given the issues identified in bullet points immediately above) that the human 
elements and the fact that virtually no mechanical device is 100 percent perfect will mean 
that the printers will continue to produce a proportion of problematic VVPATS and Long 
Reports.   
 
These facts about the rates of precinct unauditability owing to printer difficulties should be 
taken into account when assessing the long-term viability of using the DREs in Cuyahoga 
County. 
                                                 
18 “The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World,” Brennan Center Task Force on 
Voting System Security, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 2006. 
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Recommendation 2 
 
As part of the planned security review, the CCBOE should assess the viability of using 
Long Reports as part of its overall security and accountability plan.   
 
Our audit calls into question the feasibility of expecting to use Long Reports as part of any 
oversight or audit process because of the frequent problems encountered in printing them. 
The technology and human factors involved in producing the Long Reports should be 
evaluated to determine if the process can be improved or replaced by other security methods. 
 
Recommendation 3 
 
Resolve the non-unique DRE serial number problem by taking a number of actions.   
 
The occurrence of duplicate DRE serial numbers raises the possibility that the vote totals 
from one DRE unit may overwrite votes from another unit or be counted twice.  Duplicate 
DRE serial numbers may also lead to CCBOE inability to identify correctly a DRE unit 
whose internal (flash) memory needs to be used for the re-creation of voting results 
(normally when a memory card is missing or damaged), and other problems discussed above.  
These potential problems present sufficient cause to warrant further investigation by 
qualified independent professionals (not manufacturer employees or contractors) and a public 
report on findings and corrective actions taken.   
 
We believe the following steps are needed:   
 
• Determine all the purposes for which DRE serial numbers are used within the CCBOE; 
• Investigate the extent of the problem of duplicate serial numbers on DREs by checking 
both the number located on the external casing of every DRE unit and also the serial 
number that has been loaded into the firmware and publish the results of the inquiry; 
• Fully investigate and analyze why duplicate serial numbers were found on Long 
Reports and what the consequences are for vote tabulation (e.g., whether votes can be 
uploaded twice or overwritten because of this problem);   
• Require the vendor (Diebold Election Systems, Inc.) to correct the non-unique serial 
number problem and also pay for the investigation of the extent of the problem; and 
• Create and maintain a database of all DREs to track serial numbers, testing results, 
polling place location, malfunctions and service history, lifetime vote totals, and 
warranty information. 
 
 
III.  Optical Scanning: Audit of “Early Absentee Ballots”  
 
A.  Background 
 
“Optical scan ballots” are paper ballots that list each race or issue and provide ovals beside 
each voting choice.  The voter is directed to color in the oval beside the candidate or issue 
answer that reflects the voter’s choice.  Cuyahoga County’s optical scan ballots are printed 
on both sides.   The optical scanner is a device that reads and records the ballot choices the 
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voter made if his/her marks were made correctly.  Underlining a candidate’s name or placing 
an X in the oval, for instance, are not valid marks that the scanner can read.  
 
While some election jurisdictions use scanners at the polling place to scan ballots and 
tabulate voting results for each precinct (a “precinct-count” system), Cuyahoga County and 
other jurisdictions scan all optical scan ballots at a central location (a “central-count” 
system).  Numerous scanners are used simultaneously to scan the ballots.  Scanners are 
linked together in a network with the GEMS computer, which receives and records the 
scanned voting data and tabulates the election results. 
 
In Cuyahoga County, optical scan ballots are provided to a number of different types of 
voters.  All mailed absentee ballots are paper optical scan ballots, whether mailed to homes 
in Cuyahoga County or to overseas absentee voters.  But paper optical scan ballots are also 
provided at the polling places for provisional ballot voters and for “curbside” voters who are 
disabled and cannot enter the polling place to vote.  Additionally, backup paper ballots are 
provided to each precinct in case there were problems with the DRE touch screen units or 
excessive wait times for voters.   
 
in November 2006, Cuyahoga County’s policy was to scan, tabulate, and announce in its 
“unofficial results” only those absentee ballots that were received in the CCBOE offices by 
Friday, November 3rd, at 5:00 p.m.  These are often called “early absentee ballots.”  As these 
voted ballots arrived during the weeks preceding Election Day, the CCBOE staff sorted the 
absentee ballots (still in their sealed envelopes) into precincts.  Then, beginning on Saturday, 
November 4th, CCBOE staff opened, unfolded, and stacked the paper ballots so that they 
could be compressed flat.  This flattening process was designed so that the ballots would be 
more easily fed into the scanners and the scanners would be more likely to read the votes 
correctly.   
 
All absentee ballots that arrived after the Friday cut-off time and all precinct-cast optical scan 
ballots were segregated from the early absentee ballots and locked up until after Election Day 
and the unofficial results were reported.  These later-arriving absentee and precinct-cast 
paper ballots were counted and presented only as part of the official, certified election result 
totals.   
 
B.  Objectives and Limitations of the Audit 
 
Objectives.   The objective of this portion of the audit was to ascertain whether the early 
absentee ballot votes were accurately reflected in the GEMS reports of the unofficial 
electoral results.  A hand count of randomly selected precincts’ early absentee ballots by 
teams of volunteers was compared with the GEMS totals to check for any discrepancies.  
Unexplained discrepancies could indicate any of a number of different types of problems.  
Unlike the DRE audit, which only audited summary data by precinct from Long Reports, this 
audit of optical scan ballots compared actual voted ballots with the GEMs tabulation. 
 
Limitations.   As with the DRE audit, this audit of early absentee ballot scanning was of a 
limited nature because of (1) Ohio election law and (2) resources.  When the major political 
parties requested the extension of the collaborative audit to encompass optical scan absentee 
ballots, we checked with the CCBOE on when the audit’s necessary hand count could occur.  
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The Ballot Department managers said that, as with the VVPAT, the paper ballots would need 
to be locked, sealed, and unavailable for auditing until after certification and all recounts, per 
the Ohio recount statute.  This meant that the absentee ballot hand count could not occur until 
mid- to late-December.   
 
Conducting this scanning audit after certification and the recounts meant that we were in the 
midst of the university exam and December holiday season.  We knew that it would be 
difficult to assemble sufficient volunteers to conduct a hand count of three races so the CAC 
chose to audit only one race, that of the State Auditor (Sykes-Taylor).  We also knew that 
since the CCBOE Board had announced a plan to undertake a professional audit, any optical 
scan auditing beyond our Collaborative Public Audit effort could be left to the professional 
auditors.   
 
Given that we only hand-counted one race and compared these results to the GEMS totals 
produced in the unofficial count, the audit conclusions are limited.   We know that 
sometimes, depending on the ballot location of a race and how close its placement is to the 
vertical column lines, the scanners may prove differentially accurate in reading votes.19  Our 
audit of only one race could not take account of such factors and identify resulting 
discrepancies.  The Logic and Accuracy testing of the scanners is supposed to identify any 
problematic scanners so that the CCBOE deploys only those scanners having a perfect 
accuracy in reading paper ballots are used.   
 
 
C.   Methodology 
 
Overview. At the request of the Audit Committee, Dr. Mark Salling and Ellen Cyran of 
NODIS at CSU generated a random selection of precincts different from that used for the 
DRE audit.  The 72 precincts selected provided a 99% confidence standard.  The Audit 
Committee selected  the State Auditor’s race for the Audit.   
 
Detail of Chain of Custody and On-site Audit Activities As noted above, the CCBOE staff 
sorted the absentee ballots (sealed in their envelopes) into precincts.  They were then taken to 
locked rooms to be preserved until time for opening and scanning.  On Saturday, November 
4, the early absentee ballots were removed from the locked rooms and brought to the “pink 
room” for opening.  The ballots were placed flat in stacked bins.  The bins were placed in 
locked rooms until the time for the early scanning.  The CCBOE staff then sorted the ballots 
into pre-marked envelopes so that each precinct’s ballots could become a “deck” unless the 
precinct had a particularly large number of ballots cast.  Then the precinct’s ballots were 
divided into two or three separate decks.  The CCBOE purchased a machine that counted the 
number of ballots that were in each envelope, and staff recorded the number on the 
envelope’s label.  
 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., the CERP Final Report concerning the scanning problem in May 2006, in which only particular races 
were not read accurately and correlated highly to ballot placement and formatting issues.   Also see the Systest Labs 
Report concerning the optical scanning problem that is found in CERP Appendix.   
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The early absentee ballot envelopes were brought down to the basement scanning area that 
had been specially constructed for this early absentee scanning.  Up to 100,000 absentee 
ballots were expected to have arrived in time for the early count—many times more than in 
any previous election.20  After the early absentee scanning on November 6, the ballots were 
locked again. 
 
The on-site hand count audit activities occurred on December 6, 8 and 29, 2006.  A team of 
volunteers returned on February 16, 2007 to double-check discrepancies.  At the outset of 
each day of the audit, approximately 20-30 precinct files (the number the auditors felt they 
could complete in the day) were pulled by CCBOE staff from the third floor vault where all 
early absentee ballots were stored.  Members of the audit team observed the unlocking of the 
ballot vault and the transporting of the optical scan ballots to the “pink room.”  At no time 
during the audit activities did the auditors leave the ballots unattended or unsecured.  
 
The CCBOE managers represented that even though the audit occurred after all recounts, 
only CCBOE staff could legally touch the ballots.21  This rule meant that scheduling the hand 
count of the optical scan ballots was dependent upon the availability of CCBOE staff. 
 
Each hand count team of auditing volunteers was composed of four people: one “reader” of 
the ballot/race, one “observer/confirmer” that the reading was correct, and two “recorders” 
who recorded separately.22  Because only CCBOE staff can touch a ballot, one CCBOE 
staffer handled and turned each ballot as the vote was being read and recorded by volunteers.  
The CCBOE assigned two of their staffers (one Democrat, one Republican) to be present at 
all time per the managers’ representation of the law governing the handling of voted ballots. 
 
The audit recorders first recorded in ink on the audit forms (see Appendix 8 for sample form) 
all location and batch information from the label on the front of the precinct envelope.  The 
CCBOE staff (with close monitoring by the four auditor volunteers) then separated out the 
pages that contained the State Auditor race.  This segregation of the needed ballot pages 
generated a faster auditing process.  Upon realizing that some decks included some ballots 
from other precincts mixed within the selected precinct (“misfilings”), the reader and 
confirmer (and CCBOE staffer) checked the name and number of the precinct on the bottom 
of each page to make sure it was from the correct precinct. 
 
All votes were to be classified in one of four ways by the reader who called out the vote:   
“Taylor” or “Sykes” or “no vote” or “unable to determine.”   The confirming volunteer watched 
carefully to ensure the accuracy of the reader’s call.  Periodically volunteers switched roles to 
keep everyone fresh.  
 
                                                 
20  Reasons for the sharp increase in absentee ballots included (1) the 2006 Ohio statutory change to permit “no-
excuse absentee ballots” (allowing virtually any voter who wanted to vote by absentee to do so), and (2) the 
Cuyahoga County Commissioners’ public campaign to encourage voting by absentee ballot. 
21 We are not sure that this representation as to the legal constraints on touching the ballots is correct.  In the summer 
2006 ESI audit of the VVPAT, it appeared that ESI employees were touching the DRE ballot as a part of their audit 
activities.    
22  State law hand count “best practices” collected in the study that the U.S. Election Assistance Commission funded 
provide for at least these four positions in a hand count team to ensure accuracy.  (Study by Prof. Thad Hall of the 
University of Utah is not yet available via the EAC website.) 
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Two volunteers independently recorded the vote on the audit reporting form. They ensured that 
every ballot page on which the selected race was presented was reflected by a record in one of 
the four categories listed on the audit report form.  After approximately every 20 ballot pages, 
the recording process paused so the two recorders could compare their tallies.  By proceeding in 
this manner, if tallies did not match, the team only had to review the last 20 ballots to find the 
recording discrepancy rather than a full deck of ballots. Once all the votes in the race were 
recorded for all ballots for the precinct, the recorders independently tallied the results on each 
form.  They then placed the results at the bottom of the form and compared them to each other to 
ensure that the grand total for each candidate in that precinct matched across the sheets.   
 
This hand count data was later entered into a CSU computer database and then the computer data 
was checked for data entry mistakes.  The hand count results were then compared to electronic 
files provided by the CCBOE.23  These files are discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
D.   Findings 
 
We were able to audit (via our procedures for hand counting) all 72 precincts in our random 
sample of early absentee ballots.  The ballots from two of the precincts (Cleveland 13-O and 17-
K) could not be located during our first round of audits (December 6 – 8, but Ballot Department 
employees were able to track them down for our follow-up visit on December 29.  Upon 
investigation, it turned out that these missing ballots had not been filed in the correct envelopes 
but by looking at batch numbers, the Ballot Department was able to figure out with which 
precinct they had been scanned and accidentally misfiled.  This misfiling would not have 
affected the GEMS tally because each ballot page is computer-coded with the precinct’s 
identifier.  
 
After the original on-site audit activities and the first follow-up, a comparison of the hand count 
audit data with the GEMS tabulation report showed the hand count results were consistent with 
the GEMS precinct counts for 43 of the 79 precincts.  Most of the 29 tallies inconsistent with the 
GEMS report differed by only plus or minus one vote.  One precinct showed one more vote for 
Taylor and one less for Sykes than the GEMS report. One precinct, however, contained 60 
ballots in its folder while the GEMS report showed zero ballots had been tabulated for that 
precinct.  These differences are documented in four groups in Appendix 9.   
 
Discrepancy Evaluation: Off by One or Two Votes   Possible explanations or causes of the 
discrepancies of a few ballots include (1) errors in counting by audit volunteers during the hand 
count; and (2) incomplete or inaccurate sorting of ballots prior to scanning resulting in ballots 
from another precinct being present in the folder that was audited and/or ballots from the audited 
precinct being misfiled in a different precinct folder. 
 
Regarding Possible Explanation 1 
During the original audit, each team had two observers who examined the ballot pages 
before calling out the voter’s choice, and their observations were independently recorded 
by two other volunteers who then reconciled their results at several interim steps as 
                                                 
23 For the purpose of the optical scan audit a file labeled "GEMS SOVC REPORT Unofficial AVOS Only.pdf" was 
used based on guidance from the Ballot Department managers (see Appendix 13 and Part  IV of this Audit Report). 
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described in the procedure section above.  Additionally, at a subsequent return visit to the 
CCBOE, 11 of these 29 discrepant precincts were re-counted.  No errors in the hand 
count were detected. 
 
Regarding Possible Explanation 2 
The central count tabulation report for the unofficial count was made available by the 
Ballot Department.   This report shows each group or “batch” of optical scan ballots and 
shows the number of ballot “cards” (pages) in each batch and to which precinct each 
ballot “card” was assigned.  Close examination of this report showed that the ballot pages 
of 307 precincts were filed in more than one batch, and that 201 batches contained ballot 
pages from more than only one precinct.  It was also noted that in the Central Count 
Report, 12 precincts showed no ballots had been counted and no votes had been recorded.  
 
Auditors returned to examine these discrepancies on February 16 (see Appendix 10 for 
complete description).  Eleven of the precincts with fewer ballots in the hand count than 
reported by GEMS were found to have misfiled ballot pages, scanned in with a different 
precinct.  Five of the precincts with fewer hand counted ballots could not be explained by 
misfiling.  Of the 11 precincts in our sample with a higher hand-count than the GEMS report, 
three were found to be filing errors in which another precinct’s ballots were included in the 
wrong precinct deck and the auditors mistakenly included them in their hand count.  
 
The remaining eight discrepancies could not be explained by filing or hand-count errors.  The 
hand count for the precinct with one higher vote and one lower vote for the two candidates 
was rechecked and found to be accurate.  No explanation for the discrepancy with the GEMS 
report could be found for this precinct.  
 
Discrepancy Evaluation:  Precincts with No Votes Recorded in the GEMS Report 
The finding of greatest concern was the precinct, North Olmsted 2-F, which was found to 
have ballots in the precinct folder but no results reflected in the GEMS election results.  This 
precinct was also one of the 12 that did not show any ballots counted in the Central Count 
Scanning Report.  Auditors returned to examine all 12 of these precincts (expanding beyond 
the original sample) to see how common this problem was.   
 
The CCBOE apparently received no early absentee ballots for eight of these 12 precincts that 
recorded no ballots counted.  Four precincts were found, however, where it appears likely 
that all or nearly all of their early absentee ballots were not included in the unofficial SOVC 
Report24 (see Appendix 11 for a complete description).  
 
Auditors were able to physically examine the ballots and envelopes of three of these four 
precincts where the GEMS election results showed no early absentee ballots had been tallied.    
In our view, it appears that these precincts’ ballots were scanned but then deleted from the 
GEMS tally (see Appendix 12 for the CCBOE’s explanation of the omission).  The precinct 
folders the auditors examined contained ballots in numbers corresponding to the number of 
                                                 
24 The SOVC Report is the comprehensive Statement of Votes Cast Report from GEMS.  It can show, precinct by 
precinct, the total votes cast for every candidate and ballot issue and thus is quite lengthy unless a selected portion is 
requested for printing. 
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early absentee ballots that the CCBOE staff in the Candidate and Voter Services Department 
had recorded as returned in time for early scanning.   
 
The CCBOE procedure during the early scanning for the unofficial count required 
verification by the ballot tabulation staff that the number of ballot pages GEMS reported as 
having been scanned was within a certain margin of error of the number of pages reported by 
the scanner.  If not within that predetermined margin of error, the tabulation staff was 
supposed to delete the precinct batch result from the GEMS tabulation.  They were then to 
send word to the scanning room with 60 teams of scanning personnel that the deleted deck 
was to be rescanned.  In these cases, it is possible that after deleting the precinct batch from 
GEMS, the ballots were not rescanned but simply refiled in the envelope.  Two precincts 
each showed one vote in GEMS because there was a single ballot card for each of those 
precincts present in a deck that consisted of only the single card. 
 
Discrepancy Evaluation:  Ballot Decks Scanned Multiple Times   While comparing the 
SOVC electronic file with the reported numbers of absentee ballots returned, it was also 
noted that for at least two precincts (not originally included in our sample) it appeared that 
there were significantly more votes recorded than were absentee ballots.  Specifically: 
 
North Royalton 3C 770 voters  52 abs returned 118 SOVC 
Euclid -02-J  896 voters  73 abs returned 142 SOVC 
 
Examination of the Central Count GEMS report for these precincts shows each to have had 2 
batches of identical or near identical size with sequential or near-sequential numbers.  When 
we examined these precincts’ folders, there were ballots present in the folders in numbers 
consistent with the number of absentee ballots reported returned.  These observations are all 
consistent with an explanation that the ballots in these two precincts’ folder were scanned 
twice and that the votes on each ballot had been included in the SOVC election results twice.   
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E. Conclusions 
 
From the limited scope of this audit, which examined the results of one race as recorded on early 
absentee optical scan ballots that were part of the unofficial count, we may conclude the 
following: 
 
Conclusion 1 
 
Election result data in the GEMS report corresponded closely to the results obtained by 
the audit hand count of the optical scan ballots 
 
Audit results either matched exactly or were discrepant in a manner and degree consistent 
with the number of ballot pages misfiled for 57 of the 72 precincts included in the audit.  
Fourteen of the 15 precincts that did not exactly match were discrepant by plus or minus one 
vote with an aggregate of one more vote for Sykes and three more for Taylor found by the 
audit.  This is a low net error rate out of a total of 3628 votes.  The one other discrepant 
precinct was not reported in the unofficial SOVC at all and represents an apparent scanning 
procedural error. 
 
Conclusion 2 
 
The sorting process for early absentee optical scan ballots into precinct batches prior to 
scanning was neither complete nor accurate. 
 
A total of 1,768 “decks”25 were created in which the early absentee ballots from the 1,434 
precincts in Cuyahoga County were placed.  Of these 1,768 decks, 201 contained ballots 
from more than one precinct.  The election reports also show some ballot pages of 307 
precincts were separated (possibly misfiled) into more than one folder.   
 
Prior to commencing the scanning of the early absentee ballots, the CCBOE staff hand sorted 
a total of 66,228 absentee ballots into precinct decks.  We were able to identify patterns of 
misfiling: often the ballots were misfiled into precincts where extremely similar precincts 
codes to the correct code were used.  These codes often differed by only one character.  This 
pre-sorting was necessitated by concerns about the GEMS database’s limitations and its 
stability over the period of uploading optically scanned ballots.   Although the sorting was 
imperfect, without it we would not have been able to conduct this audit and compression of 
the GEMS database—and its consequent risks -- would have had to occur much more often.    
 
Conclusion 3 
 
Some discrepancies that occur at a very low frequency appear to be caused by a 
scanner misreading of some of the optical scan ballots. 
                                                 
25  A “deck” is  the electronic representation of a batch of ballots that were to be scanned together.   The scanner 
sends the accumulated results of the ballot up to the GEMS computer as one deck tally.   This deck approach is in 
lieu of scanning 55 ballots separately and sending 55 separate vote tallies up to GEMS.  By using sizable decks, the 
GEMS database does not grow as fast as having more decks with fewer ballots in each. 
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In several of the discrepant precincts, the correct number of ballots was identified in the 
initial audit and in a subsequent follow-up visit.  However, the GEMS reported results 
differed in a pattern suggesting that one or more ballots that the auditors considered to have 
been clearly marked in either blue or black ink had not been accurately read or recorded by 
the scanners/GEMS.  In these cases, one fewer vote would be reported in the GEMS data file. 
 
Conclusion 4 
 
Some ballots were apparently scanned at some point but were not included in the 
GEMS results or on the SOVC election results report. 
 
At least four precincts for which early absentee ballots had been returned showed no votes 
recorded in the unofficial election result tabulations.  In at least three cases, it appeared from 
the ballot folder documentation that ballots had been scanned and must have been deleted but 
not rescanned. 
 
Conclusion 5 
 
Some ballot batches were scanned twice with their votes double-counted when the 
GEMS unofficial results and the SOVC election results report is analyzed. 
 
The ballots in at least two precinct folders appear to have been scanned twice.  The numbers 
of optical scan ballots present in the folder was consistent with the number of absentees 
returned while the results reported in the election result tabulation for these precincts were 
approximately doubled. 
 
Conclusion 6 
 
Batch/deck numbers identifying specific groups of ballots may change within the 
scanning process and between scanning events. 
 
The deck/batch identification is arbitrarily assigned by the “header card” that is placed at the 
front of a stack of optical scan ballots prior to their being scanned.  As reflected above, a 
batch can be rescanned with a different header card.  Similarly, some of these ballot batches 
were given different digital batch identities when they were re-scanned for the official count.  
The change in ballot batch identifiers greatly impeded the accurate tracking of batches so that 
they could be confirmed as having been counted, and counted only once in the election 
tabulation.  
 
  
F.  Recommendations for CCBOE Action 
 
Recommendation 1 
 
Hand sorting into precinct batches should be replaced by an automated system. 
 
If the CCBOE has a continuing need to sort received absentee ballots into precinct-based 
groups, this process should be automated.  All of the absentee ballots originate with the 
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CCBOE and are machine addressed.  Automated sorting of the returned ballots could be done 
by a commercial mail handler using a barcode placed by the CCBOE at the time of 
addressing the mail to the voter. 
 
Recommendation 2 
 
The labeling or identity of a batch (and its electronic representation as a “deck”) should 
be unique and constant. 
 
Each deck of ballots should have a unique and immutable identity code, and ballots should 
not float between decks.  If the CCBOE continues to sort by precinct, this could be a 
precinct-based code.  Such a system would enable tracking and accounting for all ballots 
received.  It would also facilitate an audit of the performance of the optical scanning system. 
 
Recommendation 3 
 
A mechanism should be developed to record and track specific batches of ballots. 
 
Each uniquely identified deck of ballots should be scanned and included in the election 
results one time and only one time.  Possible approaches to such a system include a precinct-
based system that counts and reports the number of absentee ballots received by the CCBOE 
as the precinct bar code is read on the intake sort.  A system that uniquely identifies ballot 
decks, prevents the double counting of ballot decks, and has the ability to flag missing decks 
would be a major improvement over the uncontrolled situation that now exists. 
 
Recommendation 4 
 
The process of deleting ballot batches must have greater quality control to ensure re-
scanning of the deck.   
 
Deletion of ballot batches means a large number of ballots are not recorded in the tabulation 
unless rescanned.  The CCBOE did not use the paper and ink log to record events such as 
this, and there was deficient quality control and procedural verification over whether deleted 
batches were re-scanned.   Improving the quality control over the scanning procedure is the 
best solution.  However, an easy interim step is to perform a reasonableness test to determine 
whether all optical scan ballots in a precinct were scanned and scanned only once.  This test 
would compare the number of returned absentee ballots multiplied by the average number of 
sheets per ballot to the total number of scanned sheets.  While these totals will not match 
exactly because of variation in the number of sheets per ballot, a large discrepancy would 
indicate either deleted or double-counted decks of ballots. 
 
Recommendation 5 
 
An audit similar to this, comparing electronically recorded optical scan results to those 
obtained by hand counted examination of the optical scan ballots, should be performed  
after every election and before certification. 
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In general, the results of the counts corresponded closely in this audit.  There was, however, a 
very low frequency of lower votes recorded by the electronic system.  There is no reason to 
expect this to bias a race vote count but it does suggest that further verification of the 
accuracy and completeness of the optical scanning system under real world conditions is 
needed. 
  
 
IV.   Security, Accuracy, and Sufficiency of the Data Needed for Auditing  
 
When the Collaborative Audit Committee began its work, the presumption was that the 
tabulation data from the central tabulation computer (GEMS server) would be easily identifiable 
and readily made available to the Audit committee or Center for Election Integrity/Monitor staff 
engaged in audit work.  This proved not to be the case.     
 
A.  GEMS Election Results:  Tabulation Files and Reports 
To conduct the audit, the Center’s professional staff specified certain files in generic terms in 
writing.  We received confirmation that the ballot department would be providing the files 
needed for the DRE audit immediately upon the closing of the unofficial tabulation on 
November 8.  Although the Center went out of its way to have staff present throughout the 36 
hour Election Day and Night to take possession of the GEMS reports needed and was present 
when the election closed early Wednesday afternoon, November 8, the data that the ballot 
department supplied did not satisfy the specifications and did not permit the audit to 
proceed.   
The Center staff then undertook a series of conversations with CCBOE Director Michael Vu 
and with Diebold's technician Chris Bellis about how GEMS produces data and the types of 
files and reports that are possible after the election has closed.  We then drew up a new list of 
the data files that were needed for the audit.  If the information that we were given is correct, 
no single GEMS report is available that has exactly what is needed for both audits (absentee 
ballots and DREs).   We discovered that a series of analytic steps using several types of 
election reports was required in order to obtain the data necessary to complete the audit.  
Based on the information that we were able to obtain from the ballot department and the 
Diebold representative, we list in the accompanying footnote the data we required to 
complete the audit.26  Despite our effort to pin down the exact data required and to ensure 
                                                 
26 The electronic files or reports we apparently needed for this audit:   
 a.  GEMS Statement of Votes Cast (SOVC) Report run on the database backup after absentee ballots were 
tabulated, but BEFORE DRE memory cards were uploaded. 
b.  Database file after absentee ballots were uploaded, but before GEMS tabulation was performed. 
c.  GEMS data export after absentee ballots were uploaded, but before GEMS tabulation was performed. 
d.  Database file after DRE uploading was complete. 
e.  GEMS data export after DRE uploading was complete. 
f.  GEMS SOVC Report after all absentee ballots performed on DREs. 
g.  Need the database file after all absentee ballots performed on DREs were uploaded. 
h.  GEMS data export after all absentee ballots performed on DREs were uploaded. 
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that we obtained the requisite files immediately after the election’s unofficial count closed, 
we were unable to do so.  The Ballot Department manager advised that the files turned over 
on November 8 included all that we had requested and needed, even though they did not.  
 
 
B.  Reliability and Accuracy of the Data from the GEMS Computer 
 
Inconsistent absentee ballot results files.  For the absentee ballot audit, the ballot department 
provided several different electronic files that should have had the same data but actually 
reported different election results.  It is unclear to us, and apparently to the CCBOE as well, 
why these election results files differ (see Appendix 13).  We have no independent 
knowledge of which results file should be used or why GEMS generates a variety of files 
with varying election totals.  What is clear to us, however, is that it is critical for the ballot 
department to have accurate information on which file contains the actual total election 
results.  It is also essential information for determining the degree of fidelity the audit hand-
count has to the electronically produced election results.    
 
Raw election data and database review.   The Monitor software engineers sought to review 
the raw election data to compare it with the GEMS-reported results to determine if there were 
any errors in the GEMS tabulation.27  Additionally, certain tabulation events (i.e., server 
crashing during scanning operations; freezing of the database during a backup and 
compression operation) occurred during the unofficial count that raised the possibility of 
database corruption.   
 
The CCBOE Director initially would not permit the raw election data to be provided to the 
Audit committee or to the Monitor.  He said Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI) would 
assert trade secret or other protection of this data as proprietary.  We challenged the legal 
basis for any such claim.28 Eventually, a limited database review was conducted by Monitor 
software engineers with a DESI representative present and several CCBOE ballot and 
information services managers.  Focusing on only three of the November races, the lead 
engineer showed the observers that for each of the three, GEMS maintained two separate 
election results tables that held values that were inconsistent with one another.  The results 
differed between the two tables by over 100 votes for each of the three races checked.  
 
                                                 
27 Joe Hall of the UC Berkeley School of Information provided significant consultation as the Monitor prepared for 
this database review and served as a sounding board for other technical questions.  
28 We find that the decision in Assessment Technologies v. Wiredata, 350 F. 3d  640 (2003) (Posner, J.) (concerning 
real estate tax assessment data)  persuasively demonstrates that the election voting data would be beyond propriety 
control if urged to be protected by copyright law.  We thank Professor Mike Madison of the University of Pittsburgh 
Law School for bringing this case to our attention.  For a discussion of trade secret claims asserted by voting system 
vendors and possible challenges to those claims, see: Aaron Burstein, Stephen Dang, Galen Hancock and Jack 
Lerner, "Legal Issues Facing Election Officials in an Electronic-Voting World", Samuelson Law, Technology and 
Public Policy Clinic at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), available at: 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/samuelson/projects_papers/Legal_Issues_Elections_Officials_FINAL.pdf 
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We filed a written query with DESI, and received a response that we find raises more 
questions (see Appendix 14). In brief, the GEMS software engineer said that the tables are 
updated at different points and that this does not matter to the final results.  This explanation 
did little to alleviate our concerns.  Additionally, we have no clarity on which table contains 
the final accurate results.   
 
The Monitor’s software engineers conducting the review also found other strong indicators of 
possible database corruption, including blank fields. (See Appendix 16 for a memo on other 
database corruption indicators).   Microsoft's JET engine, which DESI used to communicate 
with the vote tally database, is documented to have a problem with unpreventable database 
corruption.29 (See Appendix 17 for excerpts from a Microsoft publication concerning 
security and corruption issues in the JET platform.) 
   
?An in-depth Monitor’s Report on technical and database issues is forthcoming. 
 
 
C.  Hardware and Software Design Impediments to Auditing 
  
Hardware design issues:  The current generation of major brand optical scanners, including 
those used in Cuyahoga County, do not count ballots but only ballot pages. In Cuyahoga’s 
General Election in November 2006, among the 59 separate jurisdictions, optical scan ballots 
could vary in length by several pages. Also, voters did not always return every page of the 
ballot when they sent it in. Thus, even if we know the total number of optical scan ballots 
that the CCBOE received for tabulation, we have no easy way to determine whether all the 
ballots were part of the tabulation.  To determine whether all the ballots had been counted, 
the CCBOE executives simply averaged the number of ballot pages and estimated that all the 
optical scan ballots had been counted.   
 
This design problem also impedes the ability to produce accurate undervote rates (in specific 
races or ballot issues).   
 
By contrast, with punch cards the CCBOE was able to determine with complete accuracy 
whether all the ballots that had been received had been counted.  The current generation 
optical scan hardware (and firmware) design, however, does not include features that are 
essential to determining whether all ballots are counted.  As a result of new, apparently 
HAVA-compliant30  equipment, we have reduced rather than increased the accuracy and 
reliability of our elections results.  This reduction in reliability is apparently due to an 
engineering design omission, one that must be redressed either by a hardware change or 
expensive auditing procedures.  
 
Software Design Issues   The GEMS system currently does not report election data at the 
DRE unit level of specificity.  The lowest level of reporting is for the precinct.  This means 
that the accuracy of particular DRE machines cannot be determined via an audit.   
 
                                                 
29  How to Troubleshoot and to Repair a Damaged Access 2002 or Later Database, (Rev. 6.1 2006) at 
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;283849. 
30 The Help America Vote Act, 42 USC SS 15301-15545. 
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D.    Security:   Logging and Data Systems in the CCBOE 
 
As stated in the Monitor’s Report on Possible Legal Noncompliance (January 8, 2007),31 the 
Ballot and Information Services Departments have failed to implement crucial Security 
Policy provisions that are designed to protect the tabulation server and the integrity of the 
election results.   The paper and ink logs that were to be used to record deleted ballot batches 
and server events were largely unutilized, in violation of the Security Policy, and probably 
one of the key reasons for the inability to track deleted batches to assure their re-scanning.  
 
E.    Recommendations for CCBOE Action 
 
1. Obtain independent guidance (to supplement and compare that from DESI) on what 
electronic files should be used for each type of election auditing, and how the files differ 
from one another.   
2. To permit accurate election audits to be conducted, the Secretary of State should specify 
the data that must be kept and for what period of time.  
 
3. The CCBOE Board should authorize the Monitor to ascertain whether the security policy 
has been fully implemented and to provide recommendations for how to achieve full 
compliance before the next election. 
 
4. A citizen’s advisory board of up to five qualified individuals should be created to focus 
on technical and security issues.  Its first task, in conjunction with the Monitor, should be 
to review, rewrite, and improve the CCBOE Security Policy.    
 
5. The CCBOE should request an independent evaluation of the GEMS database from a 
qualified consultant.  The task should be to ascertain whether database corruption 
occurred in the November 2006 election.  Secondly, the consultant should make 
recommendations on how to avoid database corruption to the maximum extent feasible 
and what steps should be taken to protect election data as tabulations are occurring.    
 
 
V. TOP TIER RECOMMENDATIONS for SYSTEMIC IMPROVEMENT 
 
This report covers many audit findings in great detail but it is by necessity limited in scope.  
Budget, timing, and legal and administrative impediments narrowed the scope of the two audits 
to such a degree that they do not provide a comprehensive view of how Cuyahoga County’s 
overall election system is functioning.  While we believe our findings are extremely important 
and merit strong consideration by the CCBOE, they are not a stopping point.  They are a first 
step in providing public oversight of the electoral system. 
 
                                                 
31 The Public Monitor Report on Possible Legal Noncompliance (dated Jan. 8, 2007) can be found at 
www.csuohio.edu/cei/.  
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1.  Independent random audits should be a routine part of the election process.  
 
Auditing is standard business practice and should be applied to our voting systems because of 
their importance. There is clear evidence that problems exist: 
 
• This Collaborative Public Audit has discovered problems with DRE Long Reports and the 
Optical Scan counting process; 
• As reported in the Cleveland Plain Dealer in November 2006, thousands of people voted 
without having signed in at the polling place; 
• Two CCBOE employees were convicted for performing illegal actions during the 2004 
recount; and   
• The ESI audit and Cuyahoga Election Review Panel assessments after the May 2006 election 
found numerous problems (e.g., 9.6% of paper audit trails, including the legal ballots, were 
defective or compromised the audit). 
 
A reasonable approach might be to perform an independent audit after each major election and a 
collaborative internal audit after smaller local elections.  The time and cost involved do not need 
to be exorbitant and will decrease as problems are resolved and process controls are put in place.  
A periodic professional independent audit could help identify needed improvements and restore 
voter confidence in the system.  Future election audits should include evaluations of the 
following issues so that internal administrative and technical systems may be improved where 
needed: 
 
• Electronic voting & legal ballots (e.g., do the paper ballots/VVPATs match the electronic 
counts?) 
• Chain of custody of election materials (e.g., were security procedures followed?) 
• Provisional ballot procedures (e.g., Did the right people cast these ballots? How many voters 
lost their vote because they were at right polling location, but were not directed to the correct 
precinct?) 
• Optical Scan/Absentee ballots (e.g., were all the ballots counted?  Were they counted 
accurately?  Were any ballots counted more than once?) 
• Security Plan (e.g., was the plan complete? Was the plan implemented?) 
• Internal Controls (e.g., were important internal processes documented? Were those 
procedures followed?) 
 
In addition to implementing a routine comprehensive professional audit, the Collaborative Audit 
Committee believes the current system, which relies upon two voting systems, should be 
seriously reviewed.  
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2.  Reconsider the feasibility and wisdom of supporting two major voting systems –Optical 
Scan and DREs. 
 
The problems found in this audit, the ESI audit, and report from the Cuyahoga Election Review 
Panel32 call into question whether it is practical and cost effective for Cuyahoga County  
to support two voting machine systems (i.e., electronic and optical scan).  Some factors to be 
considered include:  
 
• Election Costs for 2006 went well beyond the budget.  Some costs were one time costs, but 
a significant amount of the overrun was for enhanced training to help prepare poll workers 
and Election Day Technicians (EDTs) for an increasingly complicated job.  These costs 
probably will not go away because we cannot assume that these workers will return and 
remember the complex instructions that they were taught a year ago.   
 
• It is unclear if DRE electronic voting can support the turnout in a Presidential election. 
Despite a large increase in absentee voting for November 2006, a federal judge ordered 16 
polling places to be kept open after the normal closing time of 7:30 PM because of reported 
wait times exceeding one hour.   The voting turnout in a presidential year is substantially 
higher than a mid-term election.  What planning has occurred to avoid problems with lines in 
2008?  Have options other than purchasing more DRE units been considered for dealing with 
the expected spike in turnout?  
 
• CCBOE staff must be hired and trained to support both systems.  Hardware needs to be 
set up, poll worker manuals need to be provided, poll worker and professional staff training 
must be planned and executed, and different types of ballots and pre-election and post-
election testing must be prepared and executed.  All of this needs to be done for two systems 
instead of one.  Does the CCBOE have the resources (including managerial and financial) to 
achieve success with two systems?  
 
• The DREs present considerably more hurdles to complete auditing than do optical 
scanning systems.  The problems with the DRE printers causing damaged Long Reports, and 
the difficulties in locating data printed in a miniscule typeface on a narrow register-receipt 
that can be over 20 feet long, are only two impediments to DRE auditing.   
 
If the CCBOE claims that continuing to use two voting systems is the best solution, the burden of 
proof should on the CCBOE to show: 
 
• That they will resolve the problems reported in the CERP report, the ESI audit, and January 
8, 2007 Monitor memo from the Center For Election Integrity;  
• That they have or will hire the managers and staff necessary to resolve the problems caused 
by staff shortages; and 
                                                 
32  The Cuyahoga Election Review Panel’s Final Report can be found at www.csuohio.edu/cei/  (dated July 20, 
2006).  This webpage provides the option of reading or downloading the panel report in separate chapters rather than 
in its entirety of 400 pages (including appendices). 
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• The difference between maintaining two voting systems (including poll worker training, 
vendor support costs, and CCBOE staff headcount and expenses) and a single optical scan 
voting system is a defensible cost. 
 
3.  Undertake a GEMS election results Database Integrity and Reliability Evaluation 
 
The Diebold Corporation used a Microsoft database “engine” (JET) as the foundation for its 
GEMS software.  Microsoft has posted warnings that database corruption cannot be completely 
prevented in this “engine.”  Microsoft also warned that JET was inappropriate for use where 
there were high needs for data accuracy and security.  (See Appendix 17)  The risk factors for 
GEMS data integrity can be identified.  The CCBOE should examine, using a qualified expert, 
the integrity of the November 2006 GEMS database and solicit recommendations for minimizing 
the risks to the accuracy and integrity of election tabulations. 
 
4.  Evaluate the Voter Registration Software System 
 
While analyzing the feasibility of supporting two voting systems, we also recommend an 
assessment of the DIMS voter registration system. While not part of this audit, DIMS was 
repeatedly mentioned by both internal CCBOE staff and external observers as a weak link within 
the electoral system. Both the January 8, 2007 Public Monitor Report on Possible Legal 
Noncompliance and the December 7, 2006 memo from Tom Hayes of the LNE group (serving as 
the CCBOE’s Program Manager) to the Cuyahoga County Commissioners33 describe a number 
of problems with DIMS including: lost voter records due to overwriting, corrupted poll worker 
applicant information, inconsistencies in the voter history record, and lost productivity due to the 
need to reboot the system several times each day.  The CERP Final Report34 devoted almost an 
entire chapter to the DIMS voter registration database problems but reportedly no investigation 
has ever been conducted.  The range of problems has increased.  A technical evaluation to 
identify the design and operational problems, and any “glitches,” is warranted so that the 
problems can be fixed or the system replaced.  Maintaining an arguably defective voter 
registration database may present legal liability for the CCBOE as well.  
 
 
* * * 
 
This Collaborative Audit Committee appreciates the authorization to conduct this audit and 
would look forward to working with the CCBOE’s new managerial and Board Member team to 
improve election verification and other internal controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Memo from Tom Hayes, LNE Group to the Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners (December 7, 
2006), p 1.   
34 CERP Final Report, see www.csuohio.edu/cei/ at chapter 1-2.   
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 Appendix 1 
 
Background on the Cuyahoga Collaborative Public Audit: 
 
Creation, Purposes, Authority, and Participants in the  
Collaborative Public Audit 
 
 
I.  The Need to Achieve Independent Verification of Election Results 
 
Achieving accuracy in reported election results is the primary objective for any quality 
election administration.  Given the range of recent information reported nationally about 
possible problems with e-voting technologies, and also some of the problems the Cuyahoga 
County Board of Election (BOE) experienced in prior elections, election reform 
organizations and the major political parties sought to have the local election results 
independently verified as accurate reflections of the ballots cast in the November 2006 
election.  In early fall, the chief initial public concerns focused on the DRE touchscreen 
voting devices which were to be used at  polling places on election day.     
 
After discussions with election reform organizations about their concerns, the Public Monitor 
of Cuyahoga Election Reform1 introduced at a public Board meeting a proposal for a 
Collaborative Public Audit. The proposal pledged that the Monitor would seek the 
cooperative involvement of the local Democratic and Republican Parties, plus several 
election reform organizations to conduct the independent audit.  The audit, per the reform 
organizations’ requests, was to focus on the Diebold DRE touchscreen voting machines.  The 
DRE units are the primary technology used in Cuyahoga County for Election Day voting at 
the polling locations.  The DRE units are also used in “walk-in” absentee voting.2   
 
The BOE Board Members unanimously approved the DRE audit proposal (and one other 
presented in the same verification proposa) on October 2, 2006, noting that some flexibility 
might be needed and that the Board’s attorney needed to approve its legality.  Thereafter, the 
county political parties’ chairmen (Republican and Democratic) requested that the audit be 
extended to include optically scanned absentee ballots.  The Audit Committee, which had 
been formed and begun working, agreed to this extension. The CCBOE Board Members 
unanimously approved the extension as well.  
 
The Collaborative Audit participants believe the public wants independent verification that 
the election results that the e-voting technology has generated are accurate.  Additionally, 
they believe both the election administrative staff and the public at large need to know 
whether the voting machines’ programming maintained its integrity after the machines 
passed the pre-election testing and were deployed to the polling locations for Election Day.  
Reliable information on these and other questions are crucial so that sound decisions can be 
                                                 
1 The Center for Election Integrity of Cleveland State University per a proposal and testimony prepared by its 
Director, Candice Hoke. 
2 Functionally, “walk-in” absentee voting is a form of early voting. 
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 made as to the voting and database technologies we used and so that any corrections in 
administrative or other systems that are needed can be identified.   While the audits that were 
conducted are limited rather than comprehensive and conclusive on these points, the 
information acquired is useful on these and other issues. 
 
A national Election Audit Workgroup teaming the Brennan Center with with the Samuelson 
Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall School of Law (UC Berkeley), as well 
as several election officials and leading academics as been working to evaluate current audit 
laws and procedures and provide critical analysis to public officials as they begin to adopt 
audit schemes and procedures. The workgroup has thus far identified five core goals that 
should motivate the design of election auditing:  increasing public confidence in the results of 
an election; deterring fraud against the voting system; detecting large-scale systemic errors; 
providing feedback that will allow jurisdictions to improve elections and machinery in future 
years, and confirming to a high level of confidence that a 100% manual recount would not 
change the outcome of the race. 
 
We agree strongly with this statement of election auditing design goals but would add a 
sixth: providing additional incentives for the staff to reach higher standards of accuracy.    In 
order to achieve these six and other auditing goals, we have concluded, as has the Election 
Audit Workgroup, that the independence of the auditing entity is essential.3
 
The Collaborative Audit Committee commends the Cuyahoga Board of Election for taking 
this Ohio leadership role in initiating election auditing and thus creating an independent 
mechanism for verifying the announced election results.  We would also like to thank the 
over forty volunteers that gave their time over numerous days to help conduct this audit.  
Without this huge volunteer effort, this audit would not have been possible. 
 
 
 Policy Formation, Structure, and Participating Entities 
 
The participating organizations that exercised policymaking powers over the audit and 
solicited volunteers were:  
 
• Democratic Party of Cuyahoga County  
• Republican Party of Cuyahoga County  
• League of Women Voters 
• CASE-Ohio (Citizens’ Alliance for Secure Elections) 
• Greater Cleveland Voter Coalition 
 
                                                 
3 Lawrence D. Norden, Statement to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration, 
Subcommittee on Elections, March 20, 2007 at 2; Candice Hoke, Statement to the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, March 20, 2007 at 2 (this testimony to the 
Subcommittee on Elections that held hearings on Federal Election Auditing can be found at 
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6445).   
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 The Center for Election Integrity at CSU, in its role as Public Monitor for Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections, served as the coordinator of the audit process.  Center staff undertook a 
great deal of auditing duties but proposed the audit structure so that it acted as a neutral 
facilitator rather than a policymaker with a vote in Collaborative Audit group decisions.  The 
Center for Election Integrity supplied professional staff services.  Assistant Director Abigail 
Horn led the Center’s audit work.   
 
The policy decisions governing the audit, including which races to audit, were made by the 
representatives of the participating policymaking organizations.  Each participating 
organization was limited to a maximum of two representatives on the planning and 
policymaking Audit Committee. The political parties sent experienced professional auditors 
and lawyers.  The election reform organizations supplied individuals with a wide range of 
election expertise, including software engineers with technical voting technology expertise 
and poll workers or election observers.  Virtually all decisions were made by consensus.    
 
CSU’s Northern Ohio Data Information Service (NODIS),4 directed by Dr. Mark Salling 
designed the sample and audit methodology and provided analysis of the results.   
                                                 
4  http://nodisnet1.csuohio.edu/nodis/index.shtml
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 Appendix 2 
 
Methodology and Procedures to Select Sample for Cuyahoga County Election 
Audit of DRE Long Reports versus GEMS Tabulations 
 
Prepared by 
Ellen Cyran and Mark Salling 
Northern Ohio Data and Information Service 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs 
Cleveland State University 
 
December 28, 2006 
 
This report describes the methodology used to select the sample of precincts used in the audit of 
the printed long reports produced from the electronic voting machines (DRE) immediately after 
the polls close on Election Day.5  This audit is to verify the accuracy of the long reports against 
the published output of GEMS tabulation system that is produced after loading data from each of 
the memory cards used by the DREs.6
 
To insure that any discrepancy found is unlikely to affect the outcome of an election, the sample 
size is based on the closest race among those selected for inclusion by the collaborative audit 
group.  The audit group selected county or statewide races with each political party selecting a 
race and civic groups selecting the third race. The unofficial election results, which included 
electronic voting machines (DRE) at the polling locations and early absentee optical scanned 
ballots, were used to determine the closest race.  If the race was a statewide race, then the margin 
between the candidates at the state level was used in addition to the county level to determine the 
closeness of the race. 
 
The steps involved in determining the sample size are as follows. 
 
1. Calculate the percentage vote margin between the top two candidates of the closest race.  
In this case, the three selected races had only two candidates each.  
2. Since the closest race was a statewide race and the statewide percent winning margin was 
less than the county-wide margin, the statewide margin percentage was used.  The 
resulting margin was 2.1 percent of the votes cast for that race (state auditor).  
3. Apply the state percentage vote margin (2.1%) to the votes in the county for the selected 
race, divide by two, and add one to obtain the votes needed to change the winner of the 
race. This provides the number of votes in the county that need to be switched in order to 
change the outcome of the race, assuming that the percentage margin is applied uniformly 
statewide. 
4. Assume a maximum vote shift of 15 percent between the leading candidate and all other 
candidates in any precinct.  (The Brennan Center recommends 7.5 percent for polling 
                                                 
5 Multiple DREs may be (are often) used at each polling place to collect votes on one or more precincts. 
6 This audit is performed since the long reports are available for audit soon after the election.  The voter-verified 
paper audit trail (VVPAT) is not available for the audit because Ohio state law bars access to it.  
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 location sampling and 15 percent for voting unit sampling. 7 This value represents the 
estimated maximum proportion of votes per polling location, precinct, or voting machine 
that needs to be switched for a candidate in order to change the outcome of the race.)  
5. Sort precincts by descending order of votes cast in the closest race using the unofficial 
results reported from the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections tabulation server (based 
on voting from the DREs at the polls and the early absentee results). 
6. Calculate the vote shift per precinct: 
a. Sort the precincts in descending order by votes cast in the closest race. 
b. Apply the 15 percent vote shift rate to each precinct, rounding up to the nearest vote.  
The 15 percent vote shift rate is from one candidate to another or 30 percent vote shift 
margin. 
c. If the winning candidate did not receive 15 percent of the votes in any given precinct, 
then assign a zero vote shift for the precinct. 
This would total to the necessary votes to change the election result (if applied uniformly 
across the state). 
7. Sum the vote shift amount among the precincts until reaching (or just exceeding) the 
number calculated in step three; i.e., the number of votes necessary to change the 
outcome.  The count is the minimum number of corrupt votes to alter the election with a 
2.1 percent margin difference. The number of precincts, which were required to obtain 
the minimum number of corrupt votes, is the minimum number of corrupt precincts 
required to alter the election. 
8. Use a hypergeometric distribution to determine the probability P of selecting at least one 
corrupt precinct in a sample of s precincts selected from a population of N precincts 
containing b corrupt precincts.  The formula is: 
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This formula must be solved for s with a computer program8 or by estimation.  A 
computer program was used since it gives the most accurate result. The formula was 
solved to determine the number of precincts that must be audited to insure 95 percent and 
99 percent confidence interval levels. 
a. The 99 percent confidence intervals requires 110 precincts 
b. The 95 percent confidence intervals requires 72 precincts; 
9. Add 20 percent to the sample size to account for “long reports” that may not be available 
or useable.  Since the 99 percent confidence level was preferred, 22 secondary or “back-
up” precincts were added to the primary 110 precincts to be drawn in the sample. Thus, 
                                                 
7 The Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security, Lawrence Norden, Chair, The Machinery of 
Democracy:  Protecting Elections in an Electronic World, pg 22, 
http://www.Brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_39288.pdf. 
8 A Matlab program was converted to SAS to calculate the sample size, based on the minimum corrupt votes and the 
number of corrupt precincts  from step 7.  The Matlab program is available from  Dopp, Kathy and Stenger, Frank:  
“The Election Integrity Audit,” National Election Data Archive Project, September 25, 2006, 
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/ElectionIntegrityAudit.pdf. 
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 110 precincts are needed to achieve the objectives, though a total of 132 precincts are to 
be drawn. 
 
The following steps were then used to select the sample precincts. 
 
10. Select a sampling seed. Single-digit numbers submitted by each member of the audit 
collaborative were used to construct the seed. 
11. Obtain the overall sample (soverall=132) with ‘proc surveyselect’ in SAS®9 from the 
population of N = 1,434 precincts. 
12. Using the same seed as was used in the overall sample selection, obtain the primary 
sample (sprimary = 110) with ‘proc surveyselect’ in SAS® from the overall sample of 
useable forms (suseable), where suseable is expected to be between 110 and 132.   
13. Sort the 110 primary sample precincts and the 22 secondary sample precincts separately 
in descending order by votes cast in the largest precinct and polling location.  This kept 
selected precincts at the same polling place together in the listing to facilitate data 
collection from the long reports.  It also insured that the largest precincts were examined 
first and included in the sample in the event that a complete sample could not be 
implemented.  
                                                 
9 SAS®, http://www.sas.com. 
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Appendix 3 
Example of the Form for Recording DRE “Long Report” Data 
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Appendix 4 
Basic Statistics on DRE Long Report entries 
 
General: 
1. The complete sample contained 1,414 unique long reports. The BOE had 5,834 DREs to use 
on Election Day (although it is unclear if they used them all).  If all the available DREs were 
used, our sample represented 24.2 percent of all long reports. 
2. The complete sample contained 132 precincts in 121 polling locations.  This represents 9.2 
percent of all precincts in the county. 
3. The precincts in the complete sample contained 32,062 total votes cast.  This represents 8.9 
percent of the total votes cast in the county (361,025). 
4. In the long report sample, 246 unique long reports (some containing data for more than one 
precinct in our sample) were not audited at all because those precincts/polling locations were 
missing some long reports.  Without a complete set of long reports for a given precinct, we 
were unable to audit the existing long reports.   
5. This leaves 1,168 unique long reports audited and used in the frequency counts.  Some of 
these long reports contained data for more than one precinct in our sample. 
 
Race and total vote matches: 
1. 95 precincts matched the GEMS Server for total votes casts and the six candidate total in the 
three races. 
2. Six precincts partially matched the GEMS Server data since the long reports were missing for 
some of the races audited.  The two listed below matched at least one complete race.  The 
other four precincts matched at least one candidate, but not a complete race. 
 
• Lakewood 3-E, polling location 5650-Westerly Apts. (Barton Ctr) matched in total, state 
auditor and Supreme Court races. DRE SN 295434 had a tape jam so the results for 
judicial race were missing for that DRE. 
 
• East Cleveland 3-D, 4810-Martin Luther King Civic Center matched only the judicial 
race.  DRE SN 254353 was blank for the other races. 
 
3. 31 precincts did not match because of problems with long reports in those polling location.   
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Appendix 5  
Duplicate DRE Serial Numbers 
 
1. Two duplicate DREs with different vote counts were found within polling locations. 
 
DRE SN 278596 – Garfield Heights 1D, Polling location 8027-St. Timothy Manor 
 
DRE SN 254886 – Middleburg Heights 4D Polling location 6100-Baptist Mid-Missions 
 
None of the above duplicates were deleted from any reporting.  The votes in both duplicate long 
reports appears to have been loaded into the GEMS server since both are needed for the totals to 
match the audit totals.  
 
2. One duplicate DRE across polling locations was found. 
 
DRE SN 260368  - Brook Park 1E, Polling location 1460-Brook Park Recreation Center 
 Cleveland 3Q, Polling location 2261-Church Of God Of Cleveland 
 
 
Appendix 6 
2 DREs from the Same Precinct with the Same Serial Number: 
Photocopies of Excerpts of 2 Long Reports  
 [note right column portion, “MACHINE SERIAL”)  
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Appendix 7.  All Unmatched Precincts
Id
First 
Line
Polling_Place_Name Precinct_Name Votes Cast Gallagher Hastings Sykes Taylor O_Neill O_Donnell Partial Matches Comments
1 31 1460-BROOK PARK RECREATION CENTER BROOK PARK -01-E -81 -34 -20 -49 -30 -28 -37 no Missing parts of long reports
2
157 3980-CLEVELAND KOREAN PRESB. CHURCH CLEVELAND -16-P no
Missing several long reports
3
158 3980-CLEVELAND KOREAN PRESB. CHURCH CLEVELAND -16-Q no
Missing several long reports
4 189 5400-GATES MILLS COMMUNITY HOUSE GATES MILLS -00-B no All long reports missing for this precinct
5 201 7220-ST. MARGARET MARY CHURCH HALL SOUTH EUCLID -01-C -17 -9 -2 -8 -7 -8 -7 no Missing several long reports
6 225 1120-BEACHWOOD HIGH SCHOOL BEACHWOOD -00-F no Missing several long reports
7
295 6700-JOHN MUIR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PARMA -04-A -3 0 -3 -2 -1 0 -2 Partial, but not the 
same race Missing one long reports
8 308 1170-COLUMBUS INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL BEDFORD HEIGHTS -03-C no Missing several long reports
9 458 6090-MIDDLEBURG HTS. CHURCH OF GOD MIDDLEBURG HEIGHTS -04-A -277 -74 -100 -94 -137 -70 -128 no Missing several long reports
10 464 7830-ST. JUDE PARISH HALL WARRENSVILLE HTS -07-B no Missing several long reports
11
516 7580-HIGH POINT RECREATION CENTER STRONGSVILLE -02-I -1 -11 -24 0 -1 0 -1 Partial, but not the 
same race Torn long reports
12 571 4990-OUR LADY OF LOURDES SHRINE EUCLID -04-B no Missing several long reports
13 698 3012-ZION CHAPEL(MISS BAPT ANNEX) CLEVELAND -01-U -24 -12 -1 -17 -2 -8 -9 no Missing several long reports
14 718 6130-ST. WENCESLAS SCHOOL MAPLE HEIGHTS -04-C no Missing several long reports
15 719 6130-ST. WENCESLAS SCHOOL MAPLE HEIGHTS -04-D no Missing several long reports
16 773 3040-CUDELL RECREATION CENTER CLEVELAND -18-I no Missing several long reports
17 796 5650-WESTERLY APTS. (BARTON CTR) LAKEWOOD -03-E 0 -5 -2 0 0 0 0 Partial Printer jam couldn't read two races
18
842 8024-FIFTH CHRISTIAN CHURCH CLEVELAND -01-B -2 0 -1 -2 0 0 -1 Partial, but not the 
same race precinct missing on long report
19 916 2440-ST. MARTIN DEPORRES CENTER CLEVELAND -09-K no Missing several long reports
20 936 5710-LINCOLN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL LAKEWOOD -02-H -190 -58 -74 -101 -72 -79 -79 no Missing several long reports
21
937 5710-LINCOLN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL LAKEWOOD -02-I -6 -2 -1 -6 0 -3 -3 Partial, but not the 
same race Missing several long reports
22 980 4220-GLENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL CLEVELAND -09-E -189 -71 -47 -162 -8 -79 -71 no Missing 1 long reports
23 985 4860-TERRACE TOWERS EAST CLEVELAND -04-E no Missing several long reports
24 990 2265-BOYS & GIRLS CLUB OF CLEVELAND CLEVELAND -03-L no Missing several long reports
25 1013 2420-CAPTAIN ARTHUR ROTH SCHOOL CLEVELAND -09-F no Missing several long reports
26 1027 6535-SENIOR CITIZENS CENTER BLDG-G OAKWOOD -05-A -83 -36 -12 -61 -14 -32 -23 no printer problems
27 1097 4500-SIMPSON UN'D METHODIST CHURCH CLEVELAND -18-R no Missing all long reports
28 1107 4280-IMMACULATE HEART OF MARY CLEVELAND -12-D -37 -14 -17 -24 -9 -13 -19 no Missing 1 long report 
29
1153 6710-RIDGEBROOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PARMA -01-G no
Missing several long reports
30 1194 2360-EVERLASTING BAPTIST CHURCH CLEVELAND -10-J no Missing 1/2 of a long report
31
1206 4810-MARTIN LUTHER KING CIVIC CENTER EAST CLEVELAND -03-D -17 0 0 -12 -2 -11 -3 Partial
Blank tape for auditor and supreme court
32 1328 6580-ORANGE VILLAGE HALL ORANGE -00-C -11 -4 -13 -5 -4 -5 -5 no Missing 1 long report
33 1380 8018-PEARLBROOK CHURCH OF GOD CLEVELAND -16-S no Missing all long reports
34 1419 2300-ALEXANDER G. BELL ELEM. SCHOOL CLEVELAND -06-S -58 -28 -12 -50 -3 -43 -35 no Missing 1 long report
35 1527 2080-GREATER ABYSSINIA TOWERS CLEVELAND -08-O no Missing several long reports
36 1546 4290-WESTSIDE SACHSENHEIM HALL CLEVELAND -16-A no Missing several long reports
37 1547 4290-WESTSIDE SACHSENHEIM HALL CLEVELAND -16-C no Missing several long reports
Difference (Audit minus GEMS)
 
Note: Those precincts with blanks (no differences recorded) did not have completed audits because long report problems were identified at the beginning and 
auditors knew they would not have sufficient information to do a comparison with GEMS data.
 Appendix 8 
Discrepancies between PDF and sum of CSV files for unofficial results  
(128 precincts) 
 
 
Difference - Unofficial PDF results minus combined CSV results 
  
  
  
Precinct Cards 
Cast 
Sykes Taylor Gallagher Hastings O'Donnell O'Neill
BEACHWOOD -00-D 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
BEACHWOOD -00-H 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
BEACHWOOD -00-K 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
BEDFORD -01-A 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
BEDFORD -03-A 3 2 1 2 0 0 1
BEREA -02-A 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
BRECKSVILLE -00-E 2 0 1 0 2 2 0
BRECKSVILLE -00-L 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
BROOKLYN -00-A 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
BROOKLYN -00-C 2 1 0 1 0 1 1
BROOKLYN -00-F 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
BROOKLYN -00-G 2 2 0 1 1 1 1
BROOK PARK -01-A 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
BROOK PARK -01-B 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
BROOK PARK -01-C 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
BROOK PARK -02-A 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
BROOK PARK -02-C 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
BROOK PARK -04-A 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
CLEVELAND -01-D 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
CLEVELAND -01-F 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -01-N 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -01-P 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -02-A 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -02-I 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -02-S 5 5 0 0 1 0 2
CLEVELAND -03-B 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
CLEVELAND -03-R 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CLEVELAND -05-J 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -05-L 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -05-M 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -05-N 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
CLEVELAND -05-R 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -08-E 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -08-R 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
CLEVELAND -09-F 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -09-G 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -09-J 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -09-K 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
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 CLEVELAND -10-M 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
CLEVELAND -10-Q 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -11-J 2 1 0 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -13-E 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -13-X 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
CLEVELAND -15-E 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
CLEVELAND -16-D 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -16-Q 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
CLEVELAND -16-R 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -17-G 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
CLEVELAND -18-D 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -19-C 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
CLEVELAND -19-D 2 2 0 0 0 0 2
CLEVELAND -20-A 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CLEVELAND -20-N 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CLEVELAND -21-A 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -21-G 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
CLEVELAND -21-P 2 2 0 0 2 0 2
CLEVELAND HEIGHTS -
01-J 
2 1 1 0 1 0 1
CLEVELAND HEIGHTS -
04-D 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1
EAST CLEVELAND -03-G 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
EUCLID -01-D 2 0 2 0 2 1 1
EUCLID -01-M 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
EUCLID -03-K 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
EUCLID -04-D 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
EUCLID -04-I 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
GARFIELD HEIGHTS -01-
E 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0
GARFIELD HEIGHTS -02-
C 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1
GARFIELD HEIGHTS -05-
C 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
INDEPENDENCE -00-A 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
INDEPENDENCE -00-G 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
INDEPENDENCE -00-H 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
LAKEWOOD -01-A 2 0 2 0 0 0 1
LAKEWOOD -01-L 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
LAKEWOOD -02-K 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
LAKEWOOD -04-D 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
LYNDHURST -02-D 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
LYNDHURST -03-A 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
LYNDHURST -04-E 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
MAPLE HEIGHTS -03-D 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
MAPLE HEIGHTS -04-A 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
MAPLE HEIGHTS -04-C 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
MAPLE HEIGHTS -07-C 2 1 1 2 0 1 1
MAYFIELD HEIGHTS -00-
B 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
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 MAYFIELD HEIGHTS -00-
F 
2 1 0 1 0 0 1
MAYFIELD HEIGHTS -00-
M 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1
MAYFIELD VILLAGE -01-A 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
MAYFIELD VILLAGE -03-A 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
MIDDLEBURG HEIGHTS -
04-C 
1 1 0 0 1 0 1
NEWBURGH HEIGHTS -
00-A 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0
NORTH OLMSTED -01-B 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
NORTH OLMSTED -02-D 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
NORTH OLMSTED -04-A 2 1 1 2 0 1 1
NORTH OLMSTED -04-G 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
NORTH OLMSTED -04-H 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
NORTH ROYALTON -03-A 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
NORTH ROYALTON -03-E 2 0 1 0 2 1 0
NORTH ROYALTON -05-C 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
OLMSTED TOWNSHIP -
00-B 
2 1 1 0 1 0 1
PARMA -01-C 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
PARMA -01-E 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
PARMA -02-A 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
PARMA -03-A 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
PARMA -03-J 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
PARMA -04-C 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
PARMA -05-D 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
PARMA -06-D 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
PARMA -07-G 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
PARMA -08-E 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
PARMA -09-E 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
PEPPER PIKE -00-B 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
PEPPER PIKE -00-D 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
PEPPER PIKE -00-F 3 2 1 1 2 0 3
ROCKY RIVER -02-F 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
ROCKY RIVER -03-B 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
SEVEN HILLS -01-C 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
SEVEN HILLS -03-C 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
SHAKER HEIGHTS -00-JJ 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
SOLON -01-C 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
SOLON -02-B 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
SOLON -03-C 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
SOUTH EUCLID -02-G 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
STRONGSVILLE -04-C 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS -
00-F 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS -
00-M 
2 2 0 1 1 0 2
WESTLAKE -02-C 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
WESTLAKE -02-D 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
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 WESTLAKE -04-B 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
WESTLAKE -05-E 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
WESTLAKE -05-F 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Total 152 91 42 58 50 48 72
Maximum difference 5 5 2 2 2 2 3
Minimum difference 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
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 Appendix 9   Form (example) Used to Audit the Optical Scan Ballots 
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 Appendix 10 
Discrepancies in Optical Scan Hand Count from GEMS report 
 
Group A.  The audit hand count results were lower than the GEMS reported count in these 16 
precincts: 
Beachwood 0-E  -1 Sykes 
Berea 4-C     -1 Taylor 
Brook Park 1C  -1 Sykes 
Brook Park 2A    -1 Taylor 
Cleveland 14-J  -1 Sykes 
Cleveland 17-B  -1 Sykes 
East Cleveland 4-H  -3 Sykes 
Mayfield Heights 0-I  -1 Sykes 
North Olmstead 1-A  -1 Sykes 
North Olmstead 4G  -1 Sykes 
Olmsted Falls 3-A  -2 Sykes -2 Taylor 
Richmond Heights 3-C   -1 Taylor 
Shaker Heights 0-Q  -1 Sykes 
South Euclid 2-A  -1 Sykes 
University Heights 0-E -1 Sykes 
Westlake 2-B   -1 Sykes 
 
Group B.  The audit hand count results were higher than the GEMS reported count in these 11 
precincts: 
Broadview Heights 1-D +1 Sykes +1 Taylor 
Broadview Heights 2-C +1 Sykes 
Cleveland 3-K   +1 Sykes 
Cleveland 6-D   +1 Sykes 
Cleveland 7-T   +1 Sykes 
Cleveland 11-D  +1 Sykes 
Highland Hills 0-A  +1 Sykes +1 Taylor 
Lyndhurst 4-C   +1 Sykes 
Maple Heights 4-D    +1 Taylor 
Rocky River 3-B  +1 Sykes 
Seven Hills 4-B    +1 Taylor 
 
Group C.  The audit hand count results were both higher and lower for the candidates compared 
to the GEMS reported count in precinct Lyndhurst 1-B with –1 Sykes vote and +1 Taylor vote. 
 
Group D.  The GEMS reported count was zero ballots counted and zero votes in precinct North 
Olmsted 2-F.  The folder for OS ballots for this precinct contained ballots (36 for Sykes, 21 for 
Taylor, and 3 blank).   
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 Appendix 11 
Investigation of Discrepancies in Optical Scan Audit 
 
Discrepancy Evaluation – Group A 
Examination of the Central Count report for information about the 16 precincts with 
discrepancies of a lower count (Group A) showed that 11 of the precincts had ballot cards filed 
in an additional location.  Such ballot cards would have been included in the GEMS count but 
because they were not present in the folder at the time of the audit, they would not have been 
included in the audit tabulation.  There appear to be two subgroups in this category. One group 
has additional ballot cards misfiled as a minor component of another deck in numbers consistent 
with the numbers of votes missing, i.e., three ballot cards per vote.  
 
Specifically 
Beachwood 0-E  1 missing vote  3 ballot cards wrong deck 
Cleveland 14-J  1 missing vote  3 ballot cards wrong deck 
East Cleveland 4-H  3 missing votes 9 ballot cards wrong deck 
Mayfield Heights 0-I  1 missing vote  3 ballot cards wrong deck 
North Olmstead 1-A  1 missing vote  3 ballot cards wrong deck 
Olmsted Falls 3-A  4 missing votes  12 ballot cards wrong deck 
Richmond Heights 3-C 1 missing vote  3 ballot cards wrong deck 
Shaker Heights 0-Q  1 missing vote  3 ballot cards wrong deck 
 
The second group has single ballot cards scanned in a deck that consisted of only that single 
card.  The origin of these single card decks is not known. 
 
Specifically  
Brook Park 1C  1 missing vote 1 ballot card solo deck 
Brook Park 2A  1 missing vote 1 ballot card solo deck 
North Olmstead 4G  1 missing vote 1 ballot card solo deck 
 
These ballot cards were not recovered from their locations nor examined to determine votes 
marked.  The number of ballot cards in all cases was sufficient to account for the number of 
votes that were missing from the respective precincts. 
 
The discrepancies in the other five precincts in Group A could not be explained by this means 
since there was no evidence found of ballot cards filed in locations other than the folder 
examined by the audit. 
 
Discrepancy Evaluation – Group B 
Examination of the Central Count report for information about the 11 precincts with 
discrepancies of a higher count (Group B) showed that six of the precincts had additional ballot 
cards from other precincts included.  These would not have been included in the GEMS count 
but could possibly have been included in the audit tabulation if they were not recognized and 
excluded.   
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 Specifically: 
 
Broadview Heights 1-D 2 extra votes   4 cards other precincts 
Broadview Heights 2-C 1 extra votes  3 cards other precincts 
Cleveland 6-D   1 extra votes  3 cards other precincts 
Highland Hills 0-A  2 extra votes  6 cards other precincts 
Lyndhurst 4-C   1 extra votes  3 cards other precincts 
Rocky River 3-B  1 extra votes  3 cards other precincts 
 
During a second follow-up visit to the BOE, these precinct folders were re-examined specifically 
to determine if the ballot cards from other precincts shown by the Central Count to be present 
were in fact present and to determine if these ballots had been included in the audit count.  In all 
six of these precinct folders, ballot cards from other precincts were indeed present.  In three 
folders, the original audit count had apparently included the misfiled ballot cards and the 
discrepancy was resolved when these were excluded.  In the other three precincts, the misfiled 
ballots had apparently been excluded at the time of the original audit (the misfiled ballots were 
all placed first in each folder) and the re-count results excluding these were the same as those 
found in the original audit. 
 
The discrepancies in the other five precincts in Group B could not be explained by this means. 
 
Group C - Other Discrepancy Evaluation 
The one precinct (Group C; Lyndhurst 1-B ) in which the audit count was one vote high for one 
candidate and one vote low for the other was also recounted and the results were found to be the 
same as the original audit count.  
 
NOTE: During this follow-up visit, five other precincts with discrepant results that were not 
apparently explained or reconcilable by misfiled ballots were examined and re-counted.  In all 
cases the counts were the same as those from the initial audit. 
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 Appendix 12 
Precincts with All or Most Optical Scan Ballots Missing from GEMS 
 
Because we had by chance selected a precinct (North Olmsted 2F) that had OS ballots returned 
but not recorded in the Central Count Report or on the SOVC report we were aware that this was 
a possible explanation for no results and no ballots counted.  An alternate explanation for zero 
results would be if there were, in fact, no absentee ballots returned for these precincts.  In an 
attempt to determine if that was the case we determined the number of absentee ballots reported 
returned for each of these precincts by November 3, 2006, the cutoff time for inclusion in the 
early absentee scanning. This file was obtained from the BOE (absentee voters for November 
2006.csv).  Nine of the 11 precincts did not have any absentee ballots returned, but two others 
did.   
 
As a follow-up, the report of absentee ballots returned was compared to the number of ballots 
reported in the GEMS report and ballots counted in the Central Count report for all precincts.   
 
Within the limitations of the data and possible errors in the absentee information it appears likely 
that all or nearly all of the ballots for at least several precincts were not included in the unofficial 
SOVC.  Specifically: 
 
Chagrin Falls Twp A 126 voters 11 abs returned 0 SOVC 
Cleveland 2I   940 voters 30 abs returned 1 SOVC 
Cleveland 13X   920 voters 12 abs returned 1 SOVC 
North Olmsted 2F  759 voters 63 abs returned 0 SOVC 
 
We asked to examine these four decks and were able to examine three of them.  One was not 
able to be found and was not present on the log showing storage location.  The documentation on 
the folders for the three decks examined indicated that these ballots had been scanned during the 
unofficial count.  One of these had a notation “Reject delete” that had been erased but was still 
readable.   It appears that these precincts were deleted from the GEMS tally for some reason.  
The precinct folders examined contained ballots in numbers corresponding to the number of 
absentee ballots reported returned. 
 
The procedure during scanning for the unofficial count required verification by the tabulation 
staff that the number of pages reported on GEMS was within a certain margin of error of the 
number of pages reported by the scanner.  If not within that margin of error the tabulation staff 
was to delete the batch result from GEMS and the deck was to be rescanned.  In these cases, it is 
possible that after deleting the digital batch from GEMS, the ballots were not rescanned but 
simply put back in the file.  Two precincts each showed one vote in GEMS because there was a 
single ballot card for each of those precincts present in a deck that consisted of only the single 
card. 
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 Appendix 13 
BOE Email on Missing Batch in the Unofficial Count 
 
-------- Original Message --------  
Subject: Missing Batch in the Unofficial Count 
Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2006 13:28:30 -0800 (PST) 
From: Frank James Hlad <fjhlad@yahoo.com>
To: Abigail Horn <abigail@urban.csuohio.edu>
 
We have no evidence of that missing batch in the unofficial count.  As we said, it looks as if the 
batch was scanned, deleted from GEMS, and never re-scanned.  Austin had that printout that 
Kurt was talking about, and the precinct showed no votes cast.  
  
We have been unable to find transaction log information on that day.  I am not certain if that's 
because Matt and Brian don't know where to look or if the log doesn't exist.  We did locate a 
transaction log from the official count, but there was no way to sort or find data within it.  It is 
massive, as you might imagine. 
  
I guess I don't know what to tell you about all this.  Your point about dropping a batch in the 
official count is well taken.  Because we can't output data in any usable form from GEMS, we 
really have no mechanism (except eyeballs) to catch a problem like that.    F 
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 Appendix 14 
Differences between files provided by the BOE for Optical Scan Audit 
 
 
run date Title in PDF Name of File 
Received 
by Audit 
Cards 
Cast Sykes Taylor 
11/13/2006 
(12:48 PM) Post Absentee/Pre DRE gems sovc report post avos - pre tsx.pdf 11/13/2006 201,290 40,194 21,059 
11/13/2006   post avos- pre tsx data.csv 11/13/2006 201,290 40,194 21,059 
11/27/2006 
(7:52 AM) 
filename Official, but 
data is unofficial, inside 
the document only titled 
ABS 
GEMS SOVC REPORT official AVOS only 11-
06.pdf 1/31/2007 201,595 40,321 21,068 
1/31/2007  
(10:54 AM) ABS, Unofficial Results GEMS SOVC REPORT Unofficial AVOS Only.pdf 1/31/2007(?) 201,473 40,307 21,109 
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 Appendix 15 
Email Exchange between the Monitor and DESI about GEMS Database 
 
-------- Original Message --------  
Subject: Database Question posed by the Monitor 
Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2006 16:28:21 -0500 
From: Bellis, Chris <BellisC@diebold.com> 
To: Michael Vu <bempv@cuyahogacounty.us>, Lou Irizarry <belmi@cuyahogacounty.us>, 
Matthew Jaffe <bemij@cuyahogacounty.us>, Hiner, Jessica 
<jessicah@dieboldes.com>, Candice Hoke <shoke@law.csuohio.edu>, 
tryan@law.csuohio.edu 
CC: Gwen Dillingham <begdx@cuyahogacounty.us>, Green, Pat <GreenP@diebold.com> 
 
Earlier today as a result of the Monitor’s Investigation of a GEMS Database [a Monitor software 
engineer] ran the following SQL statement on a mdb file off of a CD: 
 
SELECT SUM(Vote Totals) from candidatecounter WHERE CANDVGROUPID = 1433 
 
The resulting value was 186,205. 
Then he ran the following statement on the same .mdb file 
 
SELECT SUM(Vote Totals) from sumcandidatecounter WHERE CANDVGROUPID = 
1433 AND VCENTERID <> -1 
 
The resulting value was 186, 027. 
 
Two questions emerged: 
1.       Why is the value different? 
2.       Why do we store candidate totals in two different tables? 
 
ANSWER: 
 
Chris, 
            The SumCandidateCounter table is used to store the totals by precinct rather than by counter 
batch; this was done for performance reasons. The SumCandidateCounter table is updated from the 
CandidateCounter table when a report is printed whereas the CandidateCounter table is updated when 
the when the results are posted.  Therefore if results had been posted since the last report was printed 
the totals would not match. 
             Hope this helps. 
  
Tab 
 
Talbot Iredale, P.Eng,  
Software Development Manager 
Diebold Election Systems 
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 Appendix 16 
Indicators that MAY Show Database Corruption 
(Discovered in the Monitor’s Review of CCBOE Unofficial Results Database on 11/17/06)10
 
 
1.  Table element entries were missing date/time stamps of when the information was entered. 
 
2.  Table element entries had date/time stamps of January 1, 1970, which is the epoch (zero-
point) of UNIX time.   
 
3.  In an email dated November 3rd, 2006, from DESI’s Talbot Iredale, he claimed  
 
"Accounting for transaction overhead, I do not expect the database to grow by more 
than 100 MB during absentee processing.  However this will vary dependent on what 
other other activities (printing, reports, etc.) occur during the processing." 
 
The database grew to a size greater than 100 MB for absentee processing and a size above 1000 
MB for the full election.  What happened?  Why were the estimations wrong?  Precision is very 
important, especially when dealing with votes.  Where else were DESI calculations imprecise?   
 
4. Vote totals in two separate database tables held different values.  DESI has provided a 
response, but as of yet, this response has not been tested or verified.   
 
5.  In an email from Chris Bellis dated Monday, November 20, 2006, Mr. Bellis summarized the 
"large amount of concurrent activity" that was occurring on the GEMS server on election night.  
This included DRE uploads, the JResults server running, the AVServer running, and Digital 
Guardian running, all interacting with the database in varying functions.  In a subsequent email 
from Jessica Hiner, dated Sunday, November 26, 2006, Ms. Hiner stated "In the context of an 
online system with many users, Jet would not be an appropriate choice, but that is not how we 
use it." 
 
? It appears in DESI's own words, Hiner acknowledges that when there is a large 
amount of concurrent activity, Jet database corruption can occur.  Chris Bellis has 
said that on election night, there was a lot of concurrent activity on the server.  
Taking these two statements together, it would seem very possible that corruption 
may have occurred. 
 
Microsoft's own documentation has stated that database corruption within JET is unavoidable.  
This statement is without qualifiers.  Normal operation of the Jet database includes corruption. 
 
                                                 
10 From a Monitor staff software engineer with substantial database expertise who conducted an initial review of the 
unofficial election results database with representatives of DESI and the BOE present; the Monitor’s review was 
limited to just over one hour.  T resulting information was provided to Project Director Candice Hoke, who then 
hand-delivered it to the Board Members at the November 2006 certification Board meeting. 
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 Appendix  17 
Excerpt from Microsoft Documentation on JET-Access Databases 
(emphasis added)  
 
Security 
Although Access databases (using the Jet engine) can be password protected and 
encrypted, these databases do not have the same level of security as SQL Server or 
mainframe database systems. If data security is critical, a SQL Server solution is the 
better choice….   SQL Server allows distributed data in a controlled and highly secure 
manner. 
 
Data Integrity 
Similarly, data integrity and recovery is not as robust on file-based databases using 
Jet…. 
File server databases using Jet may become corrupt and require regular maintenance 
to maintain optimal results. Even with maintenance, the chance of failure is much 
higher than with SQL Server.   …. 
 
Transaction Logs and Rollbacks 
If you need to know who modified what data, and undo changes, SQL Server's built-in 
features and triggers support this [but not Access using JET—ed.]  
An Access application can try to replicate the tracking of changes by managing user 
interaction with the data. However, it would require programming and could not be 
managed at the core data level. Mistakes in the application or other applications in 
contact with the Access data could cause data changes that are not documented. 
There are also no rollbacks [opportunities to “undo” the operation—ed.] in Access after 
a transaction is committed. 
 
 
 
 
The above paragraphs can be found in Microsoft Access or SQL Server: What's Right in Your 
Organization? at 
 http://www.microsoft.com/sql/solutions/migration/access/compare-access.mspx 
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